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Constitutional Cases 2011: 
An Overview 
Patrick Monahan and Chanakya Sethi 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This special volume of the Supreme Court Law Review, which con-
sists of papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law School’s 15th Annual 
Constitutional Cases Conference held on May 4-5, 2012, examines the 
constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released in the 
calendar year 2011.1 It was an important year for the Court: Two cases, 
PHS2 and the Securities Reference,3 are especially noteworthy, not just 
for their political significance, but their likely impact on constitutional 
jurisprudence in years to come. Several other decisions concerning 
freedom of association, equality rights and Aboriginal rights also 
reflected important developments in their respective areas, and in one 
case underscored deep divisions on the Court. In total, the Court handed 
down 71 judgments last year, a number broadly in line with its recent 
practice.4 After a sharp uptick in their number last year, however, the 
number of constitutional cases fell in 2011 to 27 per cent (19 of the 71 
decisions).5 A large majority of the constitutional cases (16 of 19 cases) 
concerned Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms rights.6 There was 
 Vice President-Academic and Provost, York University, and Professor, Osgoode Hall 
Law School. 
 Law Clerk to Justice Michael J. Moldaver, Supreme Court of Canada. All work on this 
paper was completed and all relevant files were prepared or obtained by the author prior to his 
commencing his clerkship. The views expressed are those of the author alone. 
1 A case is defined as a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the inter-
pretation of application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada”, as defined in s. 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2 Infra, note 6. 
3 Infra, note 7. 
4 The Court decided 69 cases in 2010, 70 cases in 2009 and 74 in 2008; its 10-year average 
is 77. Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition, Statistics 2001-2011, 
online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/stat/html/index-eng.asp> [hereinafter “Statistics Bulletin”]. 
5 Since 2007, constitutional cases have ranged from a low of 16 per cent in 2007 (12 of 74 
cases) to a high of 36 per cent in 2010 (25 of 69 cases). 
6 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 2, [2011] 
1 S.C.R. 19 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “CBC No. 1”]; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. R., [2011] S.C.J. 
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a trio of cases with federalism questions,7 and a single Aboriginal rights 
case.8 Notably, 2011 was a year of unusual unanimity on the Court in the 
constitutional area: the justices agreed in all but four constitutional cases, 
or 78 per cent of the time, slightly above the 75 per cent unanimity rate 
overall in the appeal judgments issued in 2011.9 
II. CHARTER CASES
The Court found for Charter claimants in 18 per cent of cases where 
there was a specific constitutional claim (2 of 11 cases).10 The Court 
dismissed the claim in each of the remaining nine cases.11 Although the 
sample size is small, this success rate is below the McLachlin Court’s 
average of 41 per cent for Charter claims over the past decade (68 out of 
167 such cases, including the 2011 cases). Five of the cases discussed in 
this section are not included in the above figures as there was no specific 
No. 3, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 65 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “CBC No. 2”]; R. v. Ahmad, [2011] S.C.J. No. 6, 
[2011] 1 S.C.R. 110 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ahmad”]; Bou Malhab v. Diffusion Métromédia CMR 
Inc., [2011] S.C.J. No. 9, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 214 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Malhab”]; Withler v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Withler”]; 
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] S.C.J. No. 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Fraser”]; R. v. Loewen, [2011] S.C.J. No. 100, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 167 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Loewen”]; Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), [2011] 
S.C.J. No. 25, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 306 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Information Commissioner”]; R. v. 
Campbell, [2011] S.C.J. No. 32, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 549 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Campbell”]; R. v. Nixon, 
[2011] S.C.J. No. 34, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nixon”]; Alberta (Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development) v. Cunningham, [2011] S.C.J. No. 37, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 670 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cunningham”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services 
Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”]; R. v. Côté, [2011] 
S.C.J. No. 46, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 215 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Côté”]; Crookes v. Newton, [2011] S.C.J. 
No. 47, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Crookes”]; R. v. Katigbak, [2011] S.C.J. No. 48, 
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Katigbak”]; R. v. Barros, [2011] S.C.J. No. 51, [2011] 3 
S.C.R. 368 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Barros”]. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter 
“Charter”]. 
7 PHS, id.; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Human Resources and Social Develop-
ment), [2011] S.C.J. No. 60, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 635 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Quebec v. Canada”]; 
Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Securities Reference”]. PHS is counted as both a Charter and a federalism case. 
8 Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 56, 2011 
SCC 56, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 535 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lax Kw’alaams”]. 
9 Though it is counted here as a divided case, the justices were unanimous in Barros, 
supra, note 6 on the constitutional issue (the extent of the accused’s s. 7 right to full answer and 
defence as it related to informer privilege) but divided on a separate criminal law question. 
10 See PHS, supra, note 6; Côté, supra, note 6. 
11 See CBC No. 1; CBC No. 2; Ahmad; Withler; Fraser; Loewen; Campbell; Nixon; and 
Cunningham, all supra, note 6. 
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Charter claim at issue, though Charter values infused the Court’s think-
ing in each case.12 
1. Freedom of Expression
The last year was a mixed one for section 2(b). Free speech advo-
cates no doubt cheered the Court’s continued march away from Hill in 
Malhab and Crookes, both of which adopted high bars for establishing 
defamation.13 Several other decisions, however, were less sanguine. The 
CBC cases marked the second and third time in recent years that the 
media suffered a setback in its attempt for greater access to the courts. In 
the two remaining cases, Information Commissioner and Katigbak, both 
of which concerned issues of statutory interpretation, the Court attempted 
to strike a balance between expressive rights and countervailing govern-
ment interests. Of note, four of the six section 2(b) cases included 
multiple opinions. In other words, with the sole exception of the frac-
tured decision in Fraser, those occasions in 2012 where the justices 
could not coalesce around a single opinion involved section 2(b) issues. 
As the following discussion illustrates, though certain justices approach 
freedom of expression in a doctrinally distinctive way, there are also 
differences between the justices when it comes to the application of long-
settled principles. 
(a) Access to Information: Information Commissioner v. Minister of 
National Defence 
After recognizing a limited right to access government information 
under section 2(b) two years ago, the Court appears to have drawn a line 
at requests for information from political actors within government 
institutions. At its core, the question in Information Commissioner hinged 
on whether certain records, requested almost a decade ago and consisting 
of agendas, notes and e-mails relating to the activities of the Prime 
Minister, Minister of National Defence and Minister of Transport, were 
subject to disclosure under the Access to Information Act.14 The relevant 
statute made clear that the ministers’ departments were subject to 
12 See Malhab, Information Commissioner, Crookes, Katigbak and Barros, all supra, note 6. 
13 See Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hill”]. 
14 R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1. 
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disclosure requirements, but their individual offices were not expressly 
included in the regime. As Charron J. observed, “[t]he question becomes 
whether Parliament intended to implicitly include ministerial offices 
within the Access to Information Act.”15 As a matter of statutory interpre-
tation, Charron J. agreed with the lower courts that the answer was, No.16 
The question remained, however, whether ministerial documents 
were under the “control” of the relevant departments, in which case the 
Act required disclosure. Here, Charron J. rejected the broader test 
proposed by the Information Commissioner on the basis that it “would 
have the effect of extending the reach of the Act into the Minister’s office 
where ... Parliament has chosen not to go”.17 Instead, Charron J. favoured 
a narrower test, adopted by the courts below, while nonetheless insisting 
that “[t]he Minister’s office does not become a ‘black hole’ as con-
tended.”18 First, the record must relate to a departmental matter.19 If it 
does not, that ends the inquiry. Second, “all relevant factors must be 
considered in order to determine whether the government institution 
could reasonably expect to obtain a copy upon request”.20 These factors 
include the substantive content of the record sought, the circumstances in 
which it was created and the legal relationship between the department 
and minister’s office. On these facts, the records were found not to be 
under the control of the relevant departments.21 
Though Charron J. did mention the Court’s holding in Criminal 
Lawyers Assn. in passing,22 the majority opinion did little to meaning-
fully engage with the implications of that case insofar as they applied in 
Information Commissioner. By contrast, LeBel J., who joined the holding 
of the Court but wrote separately, spent much of his concurring opinion 
emphasizing that “access to information legislation creates and safe-
guards certain values — transparency, accountability and governance — 
that are essential to making democracy workable”.23 With respect to the 
control test, LeBel J. criticized the majority’s approach for creating “an 
implied presumption that the public does not have a right of access to 
15 Information Commissioner, supra, note 6, at para. 26. 
16 Id., at para. 43. 
17 Id., at para. 53. 
18 Id., at para. 54. 
19 Id., at para. 55. 
20 Id., at para. 56 (emphasis in original). 
21 Id., at para. 65. 
22 Id., at para. 15. Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., [2010] 
S.C.J. No. 23, 2010 SCC 23, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 815 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Criminal Lawyers’ Assn.”]. 
23 Id., at para. 80. 
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records in a Minister’s office”.24 Pointing to Criminal Lawyers Assn., 
LeBel J. observed that the balance between government accountability 
and efficient governance “has been struck in access to information 
legislation by means of a presumption of a right of access — as opposed 
to a presumption that access should be refused — to all records, subject 
to exceptions that are specified in the legislation”.25 Because “political 
records” are not explicitly exempt from the Act, LeBel J. noted that 
Criminal Lawyers Assn. requires the Court to conclude that “the right of 
access can be presumed to apply to political records but that it is subject 
to any of the statutory exceptions that apply”.26 Notwithstanding this 
approach, LeBel J. accepts the same control test advocated by the 
majority. As he appears to concede, rather confusingly, “the presumption 
that the Act applies to Ministers’ offices does not expand the right of 
access at all” because a claimant would still need to satisfy the control of 
the record.27 One might reasonably question, then, the practical signifi-
cance of the presumption discussion in these two opinions. 
(b) The Open Court Principle: CBC v. Canada; CBC v. R. 
The two companion CBC cases decided in 2011 mark the second and 
third time in the last two years that media organizations have lost in their 
battle to gain greater access to the courts system. Echoing her reasons for 
the majority in Toronto Star, Deschamps J. held for a unanimous Court in 
both cases that freedom of the press must yield “if it has a negative 
impact on the fair administration of justice”.28 Though neither decision 
dwelled on the point, it appears in both cases the Court was drawing a 
line between newsgathering at large, which must be robustly protected 
(at least notionally), and particular newsgathering techniques, which may 
well not deserve such protection.29 That assertion was made recently in 
National Post, where Binnie J. observed that though “[c]hequebook 
journalism”, “long-range microphones” “telephoto lenses” may all be 
important for journalists, “this is not to say that just because they are 
24 Id., at para. 76. 
25 Id., at para. 82. 
26 Id., at para. 84. 
27 Id., at para. 93 (emphasis added). 
28 CBC No. 1, supra, note 6, at para. 98. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [2010] 
S.C.J. No. 21, 2010 SCC 21, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 721 (S.C.C.). 
29 See, e.g., id., at para. 85. 
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important that news gathering techniques as such are entrenched in the 
Constitution”.30 
In CBC No. 1, the media challenged regulations restricting their abil-
ity to film, take photographs and conduct interviews in the public areas 
of courthouses and to broadcast the official audio recordings of court 
proceedings.31 In CBC No. 2, they sought to broadcast a video recording 
tendered in evidence at trial.32 Justice Deschamps had little difficulty 
acknowledging a prima facie section 2(b) infringement, but at the same 
time stressed the governmental interests on the other side. “The fair 
administration of justice is necessarily dependent on maintaining order 
and decorum in and near courtrooms and on protecting the privacy of 
litigants appearing before the courts, which are measures needed to 
ensure the serenity of hearings,” Deschamps J. wrote. “There is no 
question that this objective contributes to maintaining public confidence 
in the justice system.”33 The Court seemed especially troubled by 
evidence that certain journalists in Quebec, where CBC No. 1 originated, 
had “climbed onto furniture to take photographs or to film”, “filmed 
courtroom interiors through glass doors or doors left ajar” and accosted 
accused persons and their family and friends such that some “had to be 
escorted by special constables because they were unable to enter or exit 
courtrooms”.34 In the face of such evidence, “controls on journalistic 
activities thus facilitate truth finding by not adding to the stress on 
witnesses who must participate in a process that, for most of them, is 
already distressing enough”.35 Both cases thus send a clear message that 
though the Court is committed to the open court principle, the govern-
ment and judges may restrict the depth of press access. 
(c) Artistic Expression: R. v. Katigbak 
Katigbak was the first constitutional test of the Criminal Code’s36 
new child pornography provision, a decade after the Court, in R. v. 
Sharpe,37 struck down certain aspects of the existing child pornography 
                                                                                                             
30 R. v. National Post, [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, 2010 SCC 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477, at para. 38 
(S.C.C.). 
31 CBC No. 1, supra, note 6, at para. 3. 
32 CBC No. 2, supra, note 6, at para. 1. 
33 CBC No. 1, supra, note 6, at para. 69. 
34 Id., at para. 72. 
35 Id., at paras. 73, 89; see also CBC No. 2, supra, note 6, at para. 19. 
36 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
37 [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, 2001 SCC 2, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 [hereinafter “Sharpe”]. 
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provisions as infringing section 2(b). The revamped defence to charges 
making, distributing or possessing child pornography created a defence if 
the accused’s impugned act, first, had a legitimate purpose related to the 
administration of justice or to science, medicine, education or art; and, 
second, does not pose undue risk of harm to minors. In Katigbak, the 
accused claimed that the reason he was “collecting the materials was to 
create an artistic exhibition that would present the issue of child exploita-
tion from the perspective of the child”.38 The Chief Justice and Charron 
J., writing for seven justices, concluded that the use of the word “legiti-
mate” required an objective, not subjective, assessment of whether the 
accused’s purpose was related to one of the protected activities.39 They 
cautioned, however, that “this objective assessment does not involve the 
court in any assessment of the value of the particular scientific or artistic 
activity in question”.40 Invoking Sharpe, the Chief Justice and Charron J. 
noted that “courts are ill-equipped to inquire into whether or not a work 
is ‘good’ art or not”.41 The Court split when it came to the second prong 
of the defence. Drawing on the standard of objective harm laid down in 
the obscenity context in R. v. Labaye,42 the majority favoured a case-by-
case assessment of “whether the harm is objectively ascertainable and 
whether the level of the harm poses a significant risk to children”.43 They 
rejected a more speech-protective interpretation of the defence favoured 
by LeBel J. Though he otherwise agreed with the Court, LeBel J., writing 
for himself and Fish J., asserted that any assessment of “undue risk” 
must, at least in the case of possession offences, go beyond the “generic 
harms” associated with such activity to “specific and identifiable risk of 
harm in the circumstances of the particular case”, such as a lack of 
security and ease of access to the material by others.44 To do otherwise 
“would be to practically eliminate a defence that Parliament decided to 
leave open to the accused where the purpose of the possession is related 
to the administration of justice, science, medicine, education or art”.45 
                                                                                                             
38 Katigbak, supra, note 6, at para. 2. 
39 Id., at para. 60. 
40 Id., at para. 61. 
41 Id. 
42 [2005] S.C.J. No. 83, 2005 SCC 80, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728 (S.C.C.). 
43 Katigbak, supra, note 6, at paras. 67, 70 (emphasis in original). 
44 Id., at paras. 86, 90. This was the position favoured by the Canadian Civil Liberties Asso-
ciation, which intervened in Katigbak. One of the authors of this paper assisted with the preparation 
of the CCLA’s argument. 
45 Id., at para. 87. 
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(d) Group Defamation: Bou Malhab v. Diffusion Métromédia 
Malhab, together with Crookes, offered the Court its third brush in 
recent years with the law of defamation. Unlike the recent cases of WIC 
Radio and Grant,46 the Court in Malhab was not concerned with expand-
ing defences to defamation, but with the definition of defamation and, in 
particular, whether racist comments made about a group can cause a 
compensable injury amounting to defamation under the Quebec civil 
code. Over a strong dissent from Abella J., a majority of the Court found 
that the comments at issue here did not constitute defamation, in part 
because they were “an extreme, irrational and sensationalist generaliza-
tion”.47 Malhab thus decisively continues the trend of a more speech-
protective posture at the Court since the days of Hill. 
The facts here begin with certain racist comments made by a radio 
host concerning Montreal taxi drivers whose mother tongue is Arabic or 
Creole: 
Why is it that there are so many incompetent people and that the 
language of work is Creole or Arabic in a city that’s French and 
English? ... I’m not very good at speaking “nigger” ... [T]axis have 
really become the Third World of public transportation in Montreal ... 
[M]y suspicion is that the exams, well, they can be bought. You can’t 
have such incompetent people driving taxis, people who know so little 
about the city, and think that they took actual exams ... Taxi drivers in 
Montreal are really arrogant, especially the Arabs. They’re often rude, 
you can’t be sure at all that they’re competent and their cars don’t look 
well maintained.48 
The plaintiff, a taxi driver whose mother tongue is Arabic, applied to 
the Quebec Superior Court for authorization to institute a class action for 
defamation against the host and his employer. He was awarded damages 
at trial, but the Quebec Court of Appeal reversed. 
The bulk of Deschamps J.’s opinion for the majority focuses on in-
terpreting defamation under the Quebec civil code and is thus beyond the 
scope of this paper, but extensive comments on the section 2(b) interests 
at play are notable. Though she does invoke Hill in stating that it is 
“essential to do everything possible to safeguard a person’s reputation, 
                                                                                                             
46 See WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 41, 2008 SCC 40, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “WIC Radio”]; Grant v. Torstar Corp, [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, 2009 SCC 61, 
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grant”]. 
47 Malhab, supra, note 6, at para. 92. 
48 Id., at para. 3. 
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since a tarnished reputation can seldom regain its former lustre”,49 the 
thrust of her opinion makes plain that the reconciliation of reputation and 
expressive rights does not involve the former trumping the latter. In 
particular, Deschamps J. observed, pointing to WIC Radio and Grant, 
that “[w]hat was an acceptable limit on freedom of expression in the 19th 
century may no longer be acceptable today.”50 She also pointed to 
decisions by foreign high courts of a shift, noting that “all of these courts 
are increasingly concerned about protecting freedom of expression”.51 As 
a result, “[t]he law of defamation is changing” and “this case must be 
considered” in that context.52 
Ultimately, Malhab hinged on whether an “ordinary person” would 
have found the comments defamatory. Justice Deschamps agreed with 
the court below that “an ordinary person might have been annoyed by 
[the host’s] comments but could not have applied the insults, abuse and 
offensive accusations to each taxi driver personally”.53 In particular, she 
concluded that “it is implausible that all members would have the 
specific failings imputed to them by [the host]”.54 Indeed, there is 
“simply nothing rational” about the claim that all of Montreal’s taxi 
problems could be attributed those whose mother tongue is Arabic or 
Creole.55 Moreover, the “distasteful and provocative language” came 
from a “known polemicist” who “had a satirical style and tried to 
sensationalize things”.56 As a result, his comments, though “scornful and 
racist”, because of their context “have very little plausibility from the 
point of view of the ordinary person”.57 Though wrongful, the comments 
failed to cause injury amounting to defamation.58 
In her short but forceful dissent, Abella J. placed greater emphasis on 
the harms she believed such vitriol may engender in society. “Canada’s 
strength as a multiracial, multicultural and multireligious country flows 
from its ongoing ability to develop core and transcendent values that help 
unify the differences,” she wrote. “Sometimes that means tolerating 
slings and arrows of misunderstanding that will be hurtful. And some-
                                                                                                             
49 Id., at para. 18, citing Hill, supra, note 13, at para. 108. 
50 Id., at para. 19. 
51 Id., at para. 21. 
52 Id. 
53 Id., at para. 82. 
54 Id., at para. 86. 
55 Id., at para. 87. 
56 Id., at para. 89. 
57 Id., at paras. 82, 89. 
58 Id., at para. 91. 
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times it means drawing a line because tolerating the ‘misunderstanding’ 
undermines the core of our core values.”59 The majority’s approach, 
Abella J. held, “inappropriately elevates the attributed characteristics of 
an ordinary person to those of an ordinary third-year law student”, by 
imputing to them concern about “protecting and preserving the freedoms 
of thought, belief, opinion and expression as well as the right to safe-
guard one’s reputation”.60 The comments here were “highly stigmatizing 
remarks” that “deliberately vilif[ied] vulnerable people”.61 As a result, 
they “diminish dignity and are an invitation to contempt”.62 Quoting 
from Dickson C.J.C.’s opinion in Keegstra, Abella J. noted that should 
such views “gain some credence ... the attendant result of discrimination, 
and perhaps even violence, against minority groups in Canadian society” 
is a possibility.63 Accordingly, Abella J. would have awarded damages for 
defamation.64 
(e) Online Defamation: Crookes v. Newton 
In Crookes, the Court tackled the question of whether a hyperlink 
itself constitutes publication of defamatory statements contained in the 
hyperlinked material, ultimately reaching a highly speech-protective 
result. Justice Abella, writing for the majority, offered a bright-line rule 
that “a hyperlink, by itself, should never be seen as ‘publication’ of the 
content to which it refers”.65 Under the traditional common law publica-
tion rule, to prove the publication element of defamation a plaintiff need 
only establish that “the defendant has, by any act, conveyed defamatory 
                                                                                                             
59 Id., at para. 97. 
60 Id., at para. 105. 
61 Id., at para. 107. 
62 Id. 
63 Id., citing R. v. Keegstra, [1996] S.C.J. No. 21, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 458, at 748 (S.C.C.). 
Justice Abella’s concerns in this regard echo those voiced by Frankfurter J., speaking for a majority 
of the U.S. Supreme Court, some five decades ago. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, at 
258-59 (1952): 
[The state] did not have to look beyond her own borders or await the tragic experience of 
the last three decades to conclude that wilful purveyors of falsehood concerning racial 
and religious groups promote strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjust-
ments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot community. 
Whether Beauharnais is still good law, however, is doubtful. See Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School 
District, 523 F.3d 668, at 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Although Beauharnais ... has never been overruled, 
no one thinks that the First Amendment would today be interpreted to allow group defamation to be 
prohibited”). 
64 Id., at para. 122. 
65 Crookes, supra, note 6, at para. 14. 
(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 2011 11 
meaning to a single third party who has received it”.66 Barring a depar-
ture from the traditional approach, a hyperlink would therefore have been 
captured under the definition of publication. On the facts here, a local 
politician sued the defendant, the operator of a website advocating free 
speech on the Internet, on the basis that two of the hyperlinks on his 
website linked to defamatory material, and that by creating those 
hyperlinks, the defendant was publishing the defamatory information. 
Drawing in part on developments in U.S. law67 and on the Court’s 
own growing embrace of free expression values,68 Abella J. concluded 
that the times required a rule of law that “not only accords with a more 
sophisticated appreciation of Charter values, but also with the dramatic 
transformation in the technology of communications”.69 Crucially, her 
conclusion hinged on the view that “[h]yperlinks are, in essence, refer-
ences.”70 In light of this reality, “[s]trict application of the [traditional] 
publication rule in these circumstances would be like trying to fit a 
square archaic peg into the hexagonal hole of modernity.”71 The rule 
emerging from Crookes is that “[m]aking reference to the existence 
and/or location of content by hyperlink or otherwise, without more, is not 
publication of that content.”72 Only where the hyperlinker “actually 
repeats the defamatory content” should a court find publication by the 
hyperlinker.73 On the facts here, as the links were presented without 
repeating any defamatory content, there was no defamation.74 
Though the Court was unanimous in its holding in Crookes, Abella 
J.’s bright-line rule was not sufficiently nuanced for three of the justices. 
Justice Deschamps, writing for herself, described Abella J.’s approach as 
a “blanket exclusion” that “exaggerates the difference between refer-
ences and other acts of publication” while “treat[ing] all references, from 
footnotes to hyperlinks, alike”.75 In doing so, “it disregards the fact that 
references vary greatly in how they make defamatory information 
available to third parties and, consequently, in the harm they can cause to 
                                                                                                             
66 Id., at para. 16, citing McNichol v. Grandy, [1931] S.C.J. No. 49, [1931] S.C.R. 696, at 
699 (S.C.C.) (emphasis in Crookes). 
67 Id., at para. 28. 
68 Id., at paras. 31-32. 
69 Id., at para. 33. 
70 Id., at para. 27. 
71 Id., at para. 36 (emphasis added). 
72 Id., at para. 42. 
73 Id. 
74 Id., at para. 44. 
75 Id., at para. 58. 
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people’s reputations”.76 Instead, Deschamps J. counselled “a more 
nuanced approach” informed by an analysis of multiple factors assessing 
the “the totality of circumstances”.77 The Chief Justice and Fish J., 
writing jointly for themselves, favoured a middle ground: They adopted 
Abella J.’s opinion “in large part” but cautioned that “the combined text 
and hyperlink may amount to publication of defamatory material in the 
hyperlink in some circumstances”.78 In their view, “a hyperlink should 
constitute publication if, read contextually, the text that includes the 
hyperlink constitutes adoption or endorsement of the specific content it 
links to”.79 
2. Freedom of Association 
(a) Collective Bargaining: Ontario v. Fraser 
Having opened Pandora’s box four years ago in Health Services,80 a 
bare majority of the Court attempted mightily in Fraser to contain the 
fallout while fighting off three competing views. At one end of the 
spectrum was Rothstein J., who would have overruled the case outright 
on the basis that it improvidently upset decades of the Court’s labour 
rights jurisprudence. The bulk of the majority’s reasons appear to have 
been drafted in response to his thorough assault on the earlier case. On 
the other end of the spectrum was Abella J., who sought to embrace the 
full promise of Health Services, in effect, constitutionalizing certain 
statutory protections that have usually been afforded to workers. The 
result in Fraser is that while Health Services still lives, its wings appear 
to have been significantly clipped. Nonetheless, the sharp division on the 
Court, combined with the change in its composition since Fraser was 
decided, leave the future of section 2(d) in the workplace context quite 
uncertain. What is known for sure, however, is that, with at least one case 
on the right to strike already working its way through the courts, Fraser 
will not be the last word on these issues.81 
                                                                                                             
76 Id. 
77 Id., at paras. 59, 92ff. 
78 Id., at paras. 46, 48. 
79 Id., at para. 50. 
80 Health Services and Support–Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Health Services”]. 
81 See Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, [2012] S.J. No. 49, 2012 
SKQB 62 (Sask. Q.B.) (holding that there is a s. 2(d) right to strike based on the holding in Fraser). 
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The four opinions in Fraser,82 which at some 50,000 words was the 
longest decision handed down in 2011, cannot be understood without 
reference to the Supreme Court’s controversial 2007 decision in Health 
Services, which transformed labour rights jurisprudence by overturning 
three seminal decisions in the area.83 As Deschamps J. observed in her 
opinion in Fraser, that decision “fed expectations, but it also caused 
some bewilderment”.84 The facts in Health Services concerned a provin-
cial statute that, without prior consultation or negotiation, voided certain 
collective agreements and precluded collective bargaining on a number 
of issues and conditions of employment. In striking down that law on the 
basis of section 2(d), the Court overturned several of its own precedents 
to find a right “to engage, in association, in collective bargaining on 
fundamental workplace issues”.85 Most significantly, the Court held that 
not only did this mean that workers have freedom “to unite, to present 
demands to health sector employers collectively and to engage in 
discussions in an attempt to achieve workplace-related goals”, but also 
that section 2(d) “imposes corresponding duties on government employ-
ers to agree to meet and discuss with them”.86 As one scholar observed, 
reflecting the consensus on this point, the duty to bargain in Health 
Services is “taken hook, line, and sinker from [a particular North Ameri-
can statutory labour relations model] and the detailed jurisprudence 
regarding those statutory provisions”.87 As a result, and notwithstanding 
                                                                                                             
82 The Chief Justice and LeBel J., joined by Binnie, Fish and Cromwell JJ., comprised the 
majority. Justice Rothstein, joined by Charron J., concurred in the result, but would have sought to 
overturn Health Services. Justice Deschamps, writing for herself, concurred in the result and 
accepted Health Services, albeit in a form more constrained than that contemplated by the majority. 
Justice Abella, writing for herself, dissented. 
83 The three decisions, frequently described as the “Labour trilogy”, are Reference re Public 
Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.); Public 
Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.); and 
R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.). 
84 Fraser, supra, note 6, at para. 297. The same point was not lost on others. As one lawyer 
observed to a roar of laughter during the hearing in Fraser, “there is no doubt that [Health Services] 
spawned a growth industry in the academic community and in the legal community”. Justice LeBel 
responded wryly that the decision was a “gift to the legal community”. 
85 Health Services, supra, note 80, at para. 19. 
86 Id., at para. 89 (emphasis added). 
87 Brian Langille, “The Freedom of Association Mess: How We Got Into It and How We 
Can Get Out of It” (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 177, at 209. See also Jamie Cameron, “The Labour 
Trilogy’s Last Rites: B.C. Health and a Constitutional Right to Strike” (2009-10) 15 C.L.E.L.J. 297; 
Brian Etherington, “The B.C. Health Services and Support Decision — The Constitutionalization of 
a Right to Bargain Collectively in Canada: Where Did it Come From and Where Will it Lead?” 
(2009) Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 715; Judy Fudge, “The Supreme Court of Canada and the Right to 
Bargain Collectively: The Implications of the Health Services and Support Case in Canada and 
Beyond” (2008) 37 Industrial L.J. 25.  
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the majority’s statement to the contrary,88 the general understanding 
among legal observers was that the Court had begun constitutionalizing 
certain aspects of the legislative framework governing collective bargain-
ing, all of which are peculiar to the North American “Wagner model”,89 
into a kind of judge-made constitutional labour code. 
The impact of Health Services was immediate and far-reaching. For 
example, in enacting a two-year wage freeze for public sector employees 
in 2010, the Ontario legislature exempted employees who were subject to 
collective bargaining agreements from the application of the legislation.90 
Given that 70 per cent of all employees in the broader public sector in 
Ontario are unionized, restricting a wage freeze to the approximately 
250,000 non-unionized employees in the public sector meant that the 
legislation would have a limited impact in reducing cost pressures on 
government, at best. The fiscal situation of governments in the wake of 
the 2008-2009 economic crisis is very different from that prevailing 
when Health Services was decided in 2007, with the need to restrain the 
growth in public sector compensation emerging as an overriding impera-
tive.91 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the holding in Health Services 
would come under immediate and intense scrutiny, since a broad reading 
and application of the decision could severely constrain the ability of 
governments to respond effectively to these fiscal challenges.92 
Reading Fraser offers a study in the two truths of Health Services. 
At one other extreme, Abella J., writing only for herself, concluded that 
Health Services “creat[ed] a completely different jurisprudential uni-
verse”.93 Like Winkler C.J.O. at the court below, she accepted that Health 
Services required not only a “duty to consult and negotiate in good 
faith”, but also, at least on the facts in Fraser, a statutory enforcement 
mechanism and majoritarian exclusivity, two other labour protections 
                                                                                                             
88 Health Services, supra, note 80, at para. 91 (“the right is to a general process of collective 
bargaining, not to a particular model of labour relations, nor to a specific bargaining method”). 
89 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151-169 (commonly known as the Wagner 
Act, after its principal sponsor in the U.S. Senate). 
90 Public Sector Compensation Restraint to Protect Public Services Act, 2010, S.O. 2010, 
c.1, Sch. 24, s. 4. 
91 See Commission on the Reform of Ontario’s Public Services (D. Drummond, Chair), 
Public Services for Ontarians: A Path to Sustainability and Excellence, February 2012. 
92 It should be noted, nonetheless, that Ontario, in its arguments before the Court in Fraser, 
did not ask the Court to overturn Health Services. Indeed, that Rothstein J. was willing to overrule 
Health Services in the absence of arguments by the parties drew criticism from his colleagues. See 
Fraser, supra, note 6, at para. 59, per McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J., and para. 321, per Abella J. 
93 Id., at para. 325. 
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taken right out of the Wagner model.94 Similarly, Rothstein J., writing for 
himself and Charron J., agreed that the conclusion that Health Services 
“constitutionalized prominent features of the Wagner model under s. 2(d) 
of the Charter ... is inescapable”.95 However, he found this shift in the 
Court’s jurisprudence to be deeply misguided on multiple bases and 
concluded that Health Services should be overruled.96 In particular, 
Rothstein J. charged that Health Services altered the fundamental 
conception of section 2(d) by “improperly assign[ing] collective dimen-
sions to an individual right” and “positive obligations to the essentially 
negative freedom of association”.97 The fact that two justices of the 
Supreme Court of Canada openly advocated overruling a near-unanimous 
decision of the Court that was less than five years old, and in the 
absence of argument from counsel to this effect, can only be described as 
remarkable.98 
The other members of the Court in Fraser, while refusing to accept 
that Health Services should be overruled, nevertheless attempted to 
narrow or minimize its practical impact. Justice Deschamps, who had 
been the lone dissenter in Health Services, argued that the decision 
merely represented “a step forward in the recognition of collective 
activities” and claimed that the decision “does not extend to imposing a 
duty on employers to bargain in good faith”.99 As for the Chief Justice 
and LeBel J. (the authors of the majority opinion in Health Services who 
managed to secure three other votes and thus a bare majority in Fraser), 
they asserted that Health Services never endorsed “a full-blown Wagner 
system of collective bargaining”.100 Rather, the decision established only 
“that workers have a constitutional right to make collective representa-
tions and to have their collective representations considered in good 
faith” — a proposition, they added, that is “hardly radical”.101 The Chief 
                                                                                                             
94 Id., at paras. 326, 335. 
95 Id., at paras. 226-227.  
96 Id., at para. 275. It should be noted that though Rothstein J. only called for formally over-
ruling Health Services, the majority nonetheless concluded that his reasons “impl[y] rejection of 
Dunmore as well, since the two cases rest on the same fundamental logic”. Id., at para. 56. 
97 Id., at para. 177. 
98 We note parenthetically that Health Services was decided by a panel of seven justices, as 
there was, at the time of the hearing a vacancy on the Court, which was ultimately filled by 
Rothstein J. Justice Charron, who was the only justice then on the bench who did not participate in 
Health Services, joined his opinion in Fraser. Justice Cromwell, the only other justice to join the 
Court since Health Services was decided, joined the majority opinion. 
99 Id., at paras. 300, 299. 
100 Id., at paras. 44-45. 
101 Id., at paras. 51, 43. The terminology here may be telling in that the words “collective 
bargaining”, together with their attendant specialized meaning, are no longer used. Indeed, the term 
16 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Justice and LeBel J. also emphasized that Health Services “unequivo-
cally stated that section 2(d) does not guarantee a particular model of 
collective bargaining or a particular outcome”.102 
Their markedly different approaches notwithstanding, with the 
exception of Abella J., the justices were agreed on the result in Fraser. 
The facts giving rise to the case arose from the Ontario government’s 
response to the Court’s earlier holding in Dunmore, where the Court 
struck down as unconstitutional a law that excluded agricultural workers 
from the province’s labour rights regime.103 In response, the government 
enacted a new law, the Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002 
(“AEPA”), which did not extend collective bargaining rights to employ-
ees and required only that employers consider representations from 
employee associations “in good faith”.104 That regime was upheld at trial 
as being consistent with Dunmore, but was struck down at the Ontario 
Court of Appeal. Notably, that decision was reached in the aftermath of 
                                                                                                             
“collective bargaining” is used only 65 times by the Chief Justice and LeBel J. in Fraser, in marked 
contrast to the 239 times that they used the term in Health Services. For those more technically 
minded and looking to compare apples to apples, the words “collective bargaining” appeared with a 
frequency of 1.16 per cent in Health Services but only 0.49 per cent in Fraser. In other words, 
accounting for length, Fraser used the term less than half as much as Health Services did. 
102 Id., at para. 45. 
103 The wisdom of the Court’s choice in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 
S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunmore”] was openly questioned in 
Fraser. Justice Deschamps, in her concurring opinion, suggested that the issue in Dunmore “[a]t its 
heart was the economic inequality” and that the Court’s response of a “somewhat convoluted 
framework ... appears to have been an artifice designed to sidestep the limits placed on the 
recognition of analogous grounds for the purposes of s. 15” (at paras. 315, 318). Owing to its narrow 
focus on enumerated and analogous grounds within s. 15, the Court in Dunmore chose instead to 
construct an elaborate positive rights architecture for adjudicating claims of under-inclusion in 
statutory regimes that affect fundamental freedoms under s. 2. Only L’Heureux-Dubé J., writing for 
herself in Dunmore, argued that the occupational status of agricultural workers, in this context, was a 
“suspect marker of discrimination” and thus an analogous ground under s. 15(1). In Fraser, 
Deschamps J. suggested that “it would be more faithful to the design of the Charter to open the door 
to the recognition of more analogous grounds under s. 15, as L’Heureux-Dubé J. proposed in 
Dunmore” (at para. 319) rather than reshape the jurisprudence under s. 2. She added, of course, that 
such a view “would entail a sea change in the interpretation of s. 15” (id.). While not going so far as 
to embrace such a view, the majority in Fraser did not rule out the possibility that occupational 
status could amount to an analogous ground for purposes of s. 15. Instead, the Chief Justice and 
LeBel J. acknowledged that AEPA provides a “special” scheme for agricultural workers, but that “on 
the record before us, it has not been established that the regime utilizes unfair stereotypes or 
perpetuates existing prejudice and disadvantage” (at para. 116). Moreover, they left the door open to 
a future s. 15 challenge. 
104 The “good faith” requirement was not expressly referenced in the legislation itself but 
was regarded by the majority of the Court as being implied. Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 
2002, S.O. 2002, c. 16. 
(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 2011 17 
Health Services, and Winkler C.J.O. specifically faulted AEPA for not 
including other aspects of the Wagner model.105 
The Chief Justice and LeBel J. found that the Court of Appeal’s deci-
sion “overstate[d] the ambit” of Health Services by holding that particu-
lar components of the Wagner model were constitutionally required. But 
they agreed that AEPA had to conform to the standard laid down in 
Health Services, as clarified in Fraser: employees are constitutionally 
entitled to make collective representations and to have their collective 
representations considered in good faith.106 Notwithstanding that AEPA 
was drafted and passed five years before the Health Services standard 
was even articulated, in a triumph of imaginative statutory interpretation, 
they found the law passed constitutional muster. The relevant statutory 
language is as follows: 
5(1) The employer shall give an employees’ association a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations respecting the terms and 
conditions of employment of one or more of its members who are 
employed by that employer. 
... 
(5) The employees’ association may make the representations orally 
or in writing. 
(6) The employer shall listen to the representations if made orally, or 
read them if made in writing. 
(7) If the representations are made in writing, the employer shall 
give the association a written acknowledgment that the employer has 
read them. 
The Chief Justice and LeBel J. found that the requirements in section 
5(6) that an employer “listen” or “read” representations, as may be the 
case, and in section 5(7) that an employer “acknowledge” any written 
representations “do not expressly refer to a requirement that the em-
ployer consider employee representations in good faith”.107 But, they 
added, “[n]or do they rule it out.”108 Because the language is ambiguous 
and the Legislature is presumed to enact Charter-compliant legislation, 
                                                                                                             
105 Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2008] O.J. No. 4543, 2008 ONCA 760, 92 O.R. 
(3d) 481, at para. 80 (Ont. C.A.). 
106 Fraser, supra, note 6, at para. 51. 
107 Id., at para. 101. 
108 Id. 
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the ambiguity had to be resolved in favour of a requirement that the 
employer consider the representations in good faith.109 “[C]orrectly 
interpreted”, AEPA thus “protects not only the right of employees to 
make submissions to employers on workplace matters, but also the right 
to have those submissions considered in good faith by the employer”.110 
Noting the extensive criticism that had been levelled at the decision 
in Health Services, the Chief Justice and LeBel J. argued that it was 
“premature” to conclude that the holding in the case “is unworkable in 
practice”. This seems a remarkably tepid defence of the decision, and in 
fact invites future litigants to proffer evidence of the unworkability of the 
decision in the hopes that it might be overruled. It can be expected that 
governments will continue to search for ways to limit the growth of 
compensation costs in the public sector,111 thus testing the limits and the 
scope of Health Services in the future. 
3. Fundamental Justice 
(a) Security of the Person: Canada v. PHS Community Services Society 
In retrospect, it may have been evident that the federal government 
would lose its case in PHS, arguably the Court’s most significant section 7 
                                                                                                             
109 Id., at paras. 102-104. It is ironic, in light of the Chief Justice and LeBel J.’s conclusion 
here, that the trial judge remarked of the same language: “Perhaps unfortunately there is no specific 
requirement that the employer respond to the substance of the representations; however, it should be 
noted that this would then involve the parties in a form of collective bargaining.” See Fraser v. 
Ontario (Attorney General), [2006] O.J. No. 45, 79 O.R. (3d) 219, at para. 19 (Ont. S.C.J.) 
(emphasis added). 
110 Fraser, supra, note 6, at para. 107. 
111 See the Honourable Dwight Duncan, Strong Action for Ontario (Toronto: Queen’s Prin-
ter, March 2012) (Ontario Budget 2012). The budget notes (in Chapter I, “Transforming Public 
Services”): 
The government fully expects employers and bargaining agents to reach responsible 
settlements that are respectful of fiscal realities and also maintain vital public services. 
Where agreements cannot be reached that are consistent with the government’s plan to 
eliminate the deficit and protect priority public services, or in the face of significant dis-
ruption, the government is prepared to propose necessary administrative and legislative 
measures. (emphasis added) 
Acting on that commitment, an emboldened Ontario legislature in September 2012 took steps to 
freeze the wages of public school teachers. A month later, a teacher’s union took the province to 
court over the newly enacted law on the basis that it “strips teachers ... of the right to bargain 
collectively”. Kate Hammer, “Teachers take Ontario government to court over bargaining rights” 
The Globe and Mail (October 11, 2012), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/
teachers-take-ontario-government-to-court-over-bargaining-rights/article4601152/>. See also Putting 
Students First Act, 2012, S.O. 2012, c. 11. 
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decision in the last five years, from the tenor of questions during oral 
argument. The justices repeatedly pushed the government’s lawyers to 
explain what benefit would be obtained by shutting down Insite, the 
nation’s first and only safe drug injection facility, but they never got an 
answer. “Have you got, in this case, anything that tends to demonstrate 
that this program doesn’t work?” LeBel J. asked near the end of one 
exchange. After a pause, the federal government lawyer replied, “I think 
that’s a fair observation, Justice LeBel,” and moved on to his next 
submission. Less than five months later, the Chief Justice, writing for a 
unanimous Court, concluded that Insite was an “experiment” that has 
“proven successful” because it “saved lives and improved health”.112 In 
the Court’s view, whatever benefit the state might obtain by maintaining 
an absolute prohibition on the possession of illegal drugs on Insite’s 
premises was outweighed by the resulting increased risk of death and 
disease to drug users that would flow from the decision to close the 
site.113 
The decision in PHS is significant for being at once both sweeping 
and narrow. On the one hand, the Court appears to have blessed a robust 
role, grounded in section 7, for judicial scrutiny of government policy 
not seen since Chaoulli.114 On the other hand, by stressing how crucial 
the particular facts of this case were, the Court suggests reluctance on the 
part of at least some members to wield this power very frequently. 
Though PHS is already having an impact in the courts, as we discuss 
below, its fuller ramifications will not be apparent for some time. 
Insite is located in the Downtown East Side of Vancouver (“DTES”), 
a neighbourhood that the Chief Justice described as “crippled by disabil-
ity and addiction”, where the “living conditions ... would shock many 
Canadians”.115 In an unusually detailed summary of the facts, she also 
pointed out that the DTES population includes some 4,600 drug users, 
almost half of the city’s total, and that passers-by in the neighbourhood 
would observe “addicts tie rubber bands around their arms to find veins 
in which to inject heroin and cocaine, or smoke crack from glass 
pipes”.116 It was in this context that, in 2003, after years of “research, 
planning, and intergovernmental cooperation”, local, provincial and 
                                                                                                             
112 PHS, supra, note 6, at para. 19. 
113 Id., at para. 136. 
114 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 
S.C.R. 791, at paras. 131-132 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”]. 
115 Id., at para. 8. 
116 Id., at paras. 4-6. 
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federal authorities established a facility where addicts “could inject drugs 
under medical supervision without fear of arrest and prosecution”.117 
Insite, the Chief Justice stressed, is a “strictly regulated health facility” 
run by “personnel [who] are guided by strict policies and procedures”.118 
The legal framework applicable to Insite implicates both provincial 
and federal concerns. The provincial interest arises from the provinces’ 
exclusive power over health services under section 92(7) of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1867.119 The federal interest arises from Canada’s power over 
the criminal law under section 91(27). At issue in PHS was the scope of 
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“CDSA”),120 sections 4 and 5 
of which proscribed the possession and trafficking of certain substances, 
including heroin and cocaine, both of which were being injected by drug 
users at Insite, under the supervision of medical staff. Crucially, however, 
section 56 of the CDSA provides relief to the criminal sanctions in 
sections 4 and 5 if “in the opinion of the Minister, the exemption is 
necessary for a medical or scientific purpose or is otherwise in the public 
interest”. Absent a ministerial exemption, however, drug users and Insite 
staff were liable to prosecution. In 2003, a three-year exemption was 
granted and was subsequently extended twice, through June 30, 2008. It 
was not extended or renewed thereafter. Though left unsaid by the Chief 
Justice, there was, of course, an important change in federal government 
between 2003 and 2008, with control of government shifting in 2006 
from the Liberals, who had blessed the Insite experiment, to the Conser-
vatives, who had publicly questioned it. 
The plaintiffs brought two sets of challenges against Canada. First, 
they argued that sections 4 and 5 of the CDSA are constitutionally 
inapplicable to Insite, because as a health facility it is under exclusive 
provincial control.121 Second, they asserted that those provisions’ 
application to Insite violated their constitutional rights under section 7 of 
the Charter and to that extent are invalid. In the alternative, they sought a 
declaration that any decision of the federal health minister to refuse to 
grant or extend the exemption constituted a violation of the individual 
plaintiffs’ section 7 rights. The plaintiffs succeeded at trial on the second 
argument, winning a declaration of unconstitutionality, but failed on their 
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119 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. 
120 S.C. 1996, c. 19. 
121 For more on this aspect of the case, see the discussion below, under Federalism. 
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federalism argument. The B.C. Court of Appeal split, with a majority 
finding for the plaintiffs on both the federalism and Charter claims. 
The Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court repeatedly underscored 
how central the trial judge’s findings of facts were to the ultimate holding 
in PHS. Indeed, she acknowledged that “[h]is factual findings are key to 
this appeal.”122 They included, most significantly, that addiction is an 
illness; that the use of unsanitary equipment, techniques and procedures 
for injection of heroin and cocaine, not the injections themselves, cause 
infections such as HIV and Hepatitis C; and that the risk of morbidity 
and mortality associated with addiction and injection is ameliorated by 
injection in the presence of qualified health professionals.123 The Chief 
Justice also noted that the trial judge found that since Insite’s opening in 
2003, the DTES had witnessed “a reduction in the number of people 
injecting in public”, “no evidence of increases in drug-related loitering, 
drug dealing or petty crime in the area around Insite”, and “no changes in 
rates of crime recorded”.124 The conclusion was plain: “Insite has saved 
lives and improved health. And it did those things without increasing the 
incidence of drug use and crime in the surrounding area.”125 
On the strength of the trial judge’s findings of fact, the Chief Justice 
determined there had been a deprivation under section 7. The prohibition 
on possession of scheduled substances in section 4 of the CDSA certainly 
captured the activity of the clients of Insite and potentially captured that 
of the staff.126 Either directly or indirectly, therefore, the clients’ section 7 
right was triggered: “Where a law creates a risk to health by preventing 
access to health care, a deprivation of the right to security of the person 
is made out,” the Chief Justice held, adding that “[w]here the law creates 
a risk not just to the health but also to the lives of the claimants, the 
deprivation is even clearer.”127 
Significantly, however, the Chief Justice did not conclude that the 
law itself was responsible for any deprivation. Pointing to the ministerial 
exemption in section 56, she observed that “Parliament has recognized 
that there are good reasons to allow the use of illegal substances in 
certain circumstances.”128 The constitutionality of section 4 could not be 
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determined “without considering the provisions in the Act designed to 
relieve against unconstitutional or unjust applications of that prohibi-
tion”.129 The focus of the Chief Justice’s analysis thus shifted to the 
manner in which the minister’s discretion was exercised, since section 56 
“acts as a safety valve that prevents the CDSA from applying where such 
application would be arbitrary, overbroad or grossly disproportionate in 
its effects”.130 Simply put, the question of whether there is a violation 
under section 7 hinged on the minister’s actions and, in particular, his 
decision to deny Insite an exemption from section 4. 
The Chief Justice assessed the minister’s actions against three 
principles of fundamental justice: arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross 
disproportionality. By our reckoning, PHS is the first instance where the 
Court has entertained in a single case an analysis of all three of these 
principles, which were first articulated in Rodriguez, Heywood and 
Malmo-Levine, respectively.131 That the Court has coalesced around these 
three principles is notable, in part, because they mirror the analysis 
conducted under the Oakes test: arbitrariness equates with rational 
connection, overbreadth with minimal impairment and gross dispropor-
tionality with the proportionality of salutary and deleterious effects. In 
weighing a section 7 deprivation using these three principles, which 
essentially mirror the analysis under section 1, the Court also appears to 
have accepted the necessity of engaging in a balancing of societal and 
individual interests under section 7 itself, as opposed to doing so exclu-
sively under section 1.132 
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On the facts in PHS, the Chief Justice found the minister’s decision 
to be arbitrary and grossly disproportionate. She noted that the minister 
had been quoted as saying that “the scientific evidence with respect to 
[Insite’s] effectiveness was mixed, but that the ‘public policy is clear’, 
and that ‘the site itself represents a failure of public policy’”.133 Such a 
view, the Chief Justice concluded, could not be rationally supported in 
light of the trial judge’s findings, which “suggest not only that exempting 
Insite from the application of the possession prohibition does not 
undermine the objectives of public health and safety, but furthers 
them”.134 Indeed, “Insite saves lives. Its benefits have been proven. There 
has been no discernable negative impact on the public safety and health 
objectives of Canada during its eight years of operation.”135 On that 
basis, the application of the CDSA to Insite was also “grossly dispropor-
tionate to any benefit that Canada might derive from presenting a 
uniform stance on the possession of narcotics”.136 Having found the 
denial of the exemption to be arbitrary and grossly disproportionate, the 
Chief Justice saw no need in assessing the overbreadth claim.137 Unsur-
prisingly, in light of the earlier discussion of the duplication of section 7 
fundamental justice principles and the Oakes test, the Chief Justice did 
not undertake a section 1 analysis because “no s. 1 justification could 
succeed”.138 Accordingly, the Court ordered the minister to grant Insite 
an exemption: “On the facts as found here, there can be only one re-
sponse: to grant the exemption.”139 Noting “the special circumstances of 
this case”, the Chief Justice concluded that “an order in the nature of 
mandamus is warranted” and ordered the minister to grant an exemption 
to Insite “forthwith”.140 
Given the defining role that the concept of arbitrariness, in particular, 
is playing in the section 7 jurisprudence, it is unfortunate that the Court 
did not undertake to clarify existing ambiguity about the principle’s 
meaning. The Chief Justice noted that the split in Chaoulli remains: In 
that case, three justices, including the Chief Justice, asked whether a 
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particular deprivation under section 7 was “necessary” to further the 
state’s objective.141 Three other justices, drawing on an earlier approach 
in Rodriguez, instead asked whether a deprivation “bears no relation to, 
or is inconsistent with, the state interest that lies behind the legisla-
tion”.142 PHS, regrettably, leaves this debate unresolved on the basis that 
the deprivation on its facts “qualifies as arbitrary under both defini-
tions”.143 As Binnie and LeBel JJ. observed in Chaoulli: 
To substitute the term “unnecessary” for “inconsistent” is to 
substantively alter the meaning of the term “arbitrary”. “Inconsistent” 
means that the law logically contradicts its objectives, whereas 
“unnecessary” simply means that the objective could be met by other 
means. It is quite apparent that the latter is a much broader term that 
involves a policy choice. If a court were to declare unconstitutional 
every law impacting “security of the person” that the court considers 
unnecessary, there would be much greater scope for intervention under 
section 7 than has previously been considered by this Court to be 
acceptable.144 
At least one lower court has judged it prudent to maintain the “in-
consistent” threshold: In Bedford, a case concerning a challenge to 
certain of the Criminal Code’s prostitution provisions, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal chose to adopt the more “conservative test for arbitrariness 
from Rodriguez that requires proof of inconsistency, and not merely a 
lack of necessity” on the basis that “[u]ntil a clear majority of the 
Supreme Court holds otherwise, we consider ourselves bound by the 
majority in Rodriguez on this point.”145 
No discussion of PHS can conclude without some prognostication 
about its future impact. For her part, the Chief Justice cautioned that PHS 
is not “a licence for injection drug users to possess drugs wherever and 
whenever they wish”, nor is it “an invitation for anyone who so chooses 
to open a facility for drug use under the banner of a ‘safe injection 
facility’”.146 The message is clear: The result in PHS hinges on the 
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particular facts as found by the trial judge.147 Should other such cases 
arise where “the evidence indicates that a supervised injection site will 
decrease the risk of death and disease, and there is little or no evidence 
that it will have a negative impact on public safety, the Minister should 
generally grant an exemption”.148 
There also remains the question about the future of section 7, not 
only in light of what most observers expect will be an appeal of Bedford 
to the Supreme Court, but also cases working their way through the 
courts in British Columbia concerning physician-assisted suicide and the 
Criminal Code prohibition on polygamy.149 As the Ontario Court of 
Appeal noted in Bedford, the jurisprudence in this area has been “less 
than clear”.150 Indeed, PHS leaves many unanswered questions about 
how courts should properly enforce the most enigmatic of the Charter’s 
protections. What is clear, however, is that PHS confirms, and in some 
ways advances, the Court’s foray into the realm of policymaking. As 
recognized in Bedford, which was the first significant treatment of PHS 
by an appellate court, the constitutional assessments embraced in PHS 
“inevitably draw the court into an assessment of the merits of policy 
choices made by Parliament as reflected in legislation”.151 
(b) Secret Evidence: R. v. Ahmad 
Ahmad, a case that was a decade in the making, was the first test of 
the national security amendments to the Canada Evidence Act152 enacted 
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade 
Center. After they were struck down as an unjustifiable infringement of 
section 7 at the trial level, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the entire scheme in an opinion by the Court that emphasized the 
need for a “practical approach” to interpretation of the amendments, 
which create a scheme whereby relevant evidence may be withheld 
from the defence in a criminal proceeding by virtue of national security 
concerns.153 
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At issue was section 38 of the Act, which provides for a complicated 
disclosure and notice requirement when a party seeks to disclose sensi-
tive national security information in a legal proceeding. The most novel 
aspect of the scheme is that a Federal Court judge may order, after 
weighing several factors, that certain information not be disclosed — 
even in a criminal proceeding in Superior Court. The challenge in Ahmad 
arose from the case of the so-called “Toronto 18”, who were arrested in 
June 2006 on the suspicion that they were plotting terrorist attacks.154 
Though over 150,000 records were provided as part of the Crown’s 
disclosure to the defence, significant redactions were made on the basis 
of objections raised under section 38. The trial judge held that this non-
disclosure violated both section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, because 
the Federal Court’s disclosure determinations represented an invasion of 
the core jurisdiction of superior courts, and section 7 of the Charter, 
because it infringed the accused’s right to full answer and defence. 
The Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that “Parliament is pre-
sumed to have intended to enact legislation in conformity with the 
Charter”.155 Ultimately, the Court held that 
[w]hile the statutory scheme of s. 38, particularly its division of 
responsibilities between the Federal Court and the criminal courts of 
the provinces, raises numerous practical and legal difficulties, we are 
satisfied that s. 38, properly understood and applied, is constitutionally 
valid.156 
First, the Court dispensed with the section 96 objection. Properly 
characterized, the concern “is that the criminal courts retain the ability to 
ensure that every person who comes before them as the subject of a 
criminal prosecution receives a fundamentally fair trial”.157 The Act, 
however, explicitly recognizes that “sometimes the only way to avoid an 
‘[un]fair’ trial is to have no trial at all”, and the Act expressly affirms the 
power of superior courts, in appropriate circumstances, to order a stay of 
proceedings and to otherwise safeguard the accused’s fair trial rights with 
other remedies.158 Second, as for the section 7 challenge, the Court held 
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that the trial judge “was not deprived of the ability to adjudicate the 
Charter issues that flowed from the non-disclosure order”.159 Indeed, the 
Court took the view that Parliament expressly contemplated the “more 
drastic remedy” of a stay of proceedings and “chose to live with that 
possibility”.160 Though the bifurcated scheme does have the potential to 
give rise to other challenges — such as delays, which will need to be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis — the scheme as interpreted in Ahmad 
“passes constitutional muster” because “[t]rial unfairness will not be 
tolerated.”161 
What Ahmad illustrates is a cautious and pragmatic approach to the 
interpretation of legislation intended to deal with sensitive national 
security issues. The Court is clearly reluctant to issue sweeping declara-
tions that could well have unintended consequences, favouring, instead, a 
case-by-case approach in which trial judges are empowered to ensure 
trial fairness given the circumstances before them. This practical ap-
proach seems appropriate and welcome, given the difficult competing 
considerations in this area. 
(c) Repudiation of Plea Bargains: R. v. Nixon 
In Nixon, a unanimous Court held that the Crown’s decision to repu-
diate a plea agreement falls squarely within the scope of protected 
prosecutorial discretion and is subject to judicial scrutiny only for abuse 
of process.162 In so holding, the Court firmly rejected the view that a plea 
bargain is a contract that must be enforced by a Court, while nonetheless 
cautioning that prosecutors should only resile from their agreements in 
“very rare” cases.163 Justice Charron stressed that prosecutorial discretion 
does not mean that “plea agreements can be overturned on a whim”.164 It 
would appear, however, that the Court understands the binding effect of 
plea agreements to be protected, generally, not by direct judicial en-
forcement (absent some abuse of process), but from the practical consid-
eration that defence counsel will only enter into such bargains if they are 
virtually certain to be honoured by the Crown.165 
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On the facts in Nixon, the accused drove her motor home through an 
intersection without stopping and struck another vehicle, killing a 
husband and wife and injuring their young son. Tests showed she was 
intoxicated. Initially, she was charged with dangerous driving causing 
death, dangerous driving causing bodily harm and impaired driving, but 
Crown counsel, worried about the admissibility of certain evidence, 
agreed to a plea of careless driving and a $1,800 fine. Due to the sensi-
tive nature of the case, an Assistant Deputy Minister (“ADM”) in the 
Ministry of the Attorney General was advised of the plea. After obtaining 
legal opinions about the merits of the prosecution and the ability to 
repudiate plea agreements, the ADM concluded that Crown counsel’s 
assessment of the strength of the case was flawed. The ADM further 
concluded that the plea agreement was contrary to the interests of justice 
and that it could be repudiated without prejudice to the accused. The 
decision to repudiate the plea prompted the accused’s Charter challenge. 
Justice Charron, pointing to Krieger,166 the Court’s last decision on 
prosecutorial discretion, held that the discretion to accept a guilty plea to 
a lesser charge fell squarely within the ambit of prosecutorial discre-
tion.167 The nuance in Nixon arose from the possible distinction between 
a decision to accept a guilty plea and a decision to subsequently with-
draw that plea once accepted. Justice Charron concluded that prosecuto-
rial discretion here “was not spent with the decision to initiate the 
proceedings, nor did it terminate with the plea agreement”.168 The logic 
here appears to be that, so long as proceedings continue, the Crown may 
be required to make further decisions about whether the prosecution 
should be continued and, if so, in respect of what charges. Accordingly, 
the Crown’s ultimate decision to resile from the plea agreement and to 
continue the prosecution is subject to the principles set out in Krieger: “it 
is only subject to judicial review for abuse of process”.169 In such a 
review, though the ultimate burden remains on the accused to establish 
an abuse of process, “the Crown must explain why and how it made the 
decision not to honour the plea agreement”.170 Pointing to earlier juris-
prudence, Charron J. noted that an accused’s section 7 rights might be 
affected by (1) prosecutorial conduct affecting the fairness of the trial; 
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and (2) prosecutorial conduct that contravenes fundamental notions of 
justice and thus undermines the integrity of the judicial process.171 
On the facts in Nixon, Charron J. pointed to the trial judge’s findings 
that the ADM’s decision appeared to have been made in good faith and 
that there was “nothing improper in the considerations that informed the 
ADM’s decision to resile from the agreement”.172 Furthermore, she found 
that act of repudiation “was indeed a rare and exceptional occurrence”,173 
with only two prior occurrences in the province since the 1980s. Finally, 
the accused suffered no prejudice, in that she was returned to the position 
she had been in at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing before the 
plea agreement was entered into.174 Therefore Charron J. found, correctly 
in our view, that no Charter breach had occurred. 
(d) Informer Privilege: R. v. Barros 
Barros holds that an accused’s section 7 right to full answer and 
defence generally permits him to make efforts to discern the identity of a 
confidential police informant. Here, the Crown alleged that an investiga-
tor hired by defence counsel used threats to determine the identity of a 
police informer for use as a bargaining lever to force the Crown to 
withdraw the charges rather than risk disclosure of the informer’s 
identity. The investigator, after approaching police with information 
about the identity of the informer, was charged with obstruction of justice 
and extortion, but was acquitted by the trial judge on the basis of section 
7. The Alberta Court of Appeal overturned, finding that informer’s 
privilege prohibits the accused or anyone on his behalf from making 
efforts even wholly independent of the prosecution to discover the 
identity of the informant. Justice Binnie, writing for a Court unanimous 
on the Charter question, reversed, holding the transformation of “a rule 
of non-disclosure binding on the police, the prosecutorial authorities and 
the courts into a general prohibition of investigation into police informers 
binding on the whole world ... goes too far”.175 
Recognizing that “[i]nformers come in all shapes and sizes”, Binnie 
J. observed that “[t]he defence is entitled to do what it can to poke holes 
in the prosecution’s case, provided that the methods used are otherwise 
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lawful.”176 The so-called “innocence at stake” exception — the only 
exception to the otherwise blanket privilege — “pertains to disclosure 
by the state of the informer’s identity, not to information obtained by 
the defence through its own resources”.177 To criminalize efforts by the 
defence “to ascertain the identity of the source independently of the 
Crown would in many cases render illusory the right to challenge his or 
her ‘informer’ status”.178 That said, the right to full answer and defence 
has limits: “[T]he methods and purpose of the defence investigation, and 
the use to which any information obtained is put” may cross the line into 
obstruction of justice, depending on a case-by-case evaluation of the 
totality of circumstances.179 Crucially, Binnie J. noted that efforts to elicit 
information from prosecutors and police officers, who are bound by the 
duty to protect the identity of informers, “will not be tolerated”.180 As to 
the facts in Barros, the Court divided, with Fish and Cromwell JJ. each 
dissenting separately, and the majority remanding the case back for a 
new trial on two of three counts.181 
4. Search and Seizure 
Last year was a quiet one for the Court on the section 8 front. In both 
Loewen and Campbell, two cases that reached the Court as of right, the 
justices unanimously dismissed the accused’s appeal, finding in each 
case that there had been reasonable grounds for the impugned searches. 
The third case, Côté, made no new law, but is notable if only because of 
the force with which a majority of the Court affirmed the lower courts’ 
holding to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter where 
there has been a violation of the accused’s constitutional rights. 
(a) Systemic Rights Violations: R. v. Côté 
The Court in Côté was faced with what it called the “serious and sys-
tematic disregard for Charter rights by the police”.182 The trial judge in 
the case had concluded that the police “had violated virtually every 
                                                                                                             
176 Id., at para. 38. 
177 Id. (emphasis in original). 
178 Id., at para. 39. 
179 Id., at para. 41. 
180 Id., at para. 43. 
181 Id., at para. 83. 
182 Côté, supra, note 6, at para. 1. 
(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 2011 31 
Charter right accorded to a suspect in a criminal investigation” and that 
the violations “were not the result of isolated errors of judgment on the 
part of the police investigators, but rather were part of a larger pattern of 
disregard of the appellant’s Charter rights”.183 In the face of such con-
duct, the trial judge concluded that to admit the evidence in the face of 
what Cromwell J., writing for the majority, described as “extraordinarily 
troubling police misconduct”, even when the decision would lead to an 
acquittal on a murder charge, would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute.184 The Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s 
appeal in part, admitting some of the evidence and ordering a new trial. 
The Supreme Court reversed over the lone dissent of Deschamps J., who 
typically takes a harder line on exclusion under section 24(2). Though 
she acknowledged the “the police misconduct, considered as a whole, is 
serious and the courts must dissociate themselves from it”, in Côté it was 
“possible to do so in respect of the constitutional violations in this case 
without excluding all the evidence”.185 
Much of Cromwell J.’s opinion focused on reiterating that trial 
judges, provided they have considered the proper factors and have not 
made any unreasonable finding, are owed “considerable deference” on 
review.186 He did not mince words in criticizing the Court of Appeal in 
Côté, which “exceeded its role by its re-characterization of the evidence” 
in the absence of “any clear and determinative error” by the trial judge.187 
He also faulted the Court of Appeal for focusing excessively on the 
discoverability of certain derivative evidence when there was evidence 
that the trial judge had considered this factor and nonetheless decided to 
exclude the evidence.188 Côté thus echoes a point made recently in R. v. 
Beaulieu188A: where a trial judge considers the relevant factors, his or her 
ruling on section 24(2) will be upheld on appeal. 
5. Equality 
After several uneventful years on the section 15 front, the Court took 
two separate opportunities to clarify its last significant pronouncement in 
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the seminal 2008 decision in R. v. Kapp.189 In Withler, the Court tweaked 
its approach to section 15(1), ousting what had been understood as a 
requirement to craft so-called “mirror” comparator groups. In Cunning-
ham, the Court revisited section 15(2), confirming that if the government 
can establish an ameliorative program under that subsection of section 
15, it will be immunized from further judicial scrutiny under section 
15(1). These two cases evidence a further bifurcation of the Court’s 
approach to section 15, with section 15(1) largely acting as an anti-
discrimination provision and section 15(2) serving to promote (and 
protect) the government’s ameliorative programs. For some, this result 
will be disappointing. Notwithstanding its repeated assurances of a 
commitment to substantive equality, in saying that the purpose of section 
15(1) is to “[protect] every person’s equal right to be free from discrimi-
nation” — that is, in conceiving of it as a negative freedom as opposed to 
a positive right — the Court may be seen as limiting the potential of 
what equality-seeking groups can accomplish through the courts.190 
Others will welcome Withler’s attempt to clarify the unduly complicated 
jurisprudence in this area. 
(a) “Mirror” Comparator Groups: Withler v. Canada 
In Withler, the Court returns again to a familiar and recurring issue, 
namely, the appropriate framework for the analysis of equality claims 
under section 15 of the Charter. The Court’s equality jurisprudence has 
had a troubled and chequered past, dating from the landmark 1989 
Andrews decision in which the Court emphasized the importance of a 
focus on “substantive” as opposed to “formal” equality.191 The difficulty 
is that over more than two decades and despite numerous attempts, 
including a number of false starts, the Court has had extraordinary 
difficulty in translating that key concept into a practical framework that 
is readily intelligible to lower courts and litigants. 
In Withler, the Chief Justice and Abella J., writing for a unanimous 
Court, reiterate the oft-repeated admonition that substantive equality 
“rejects the mere presence or absence of difference as an answer to 
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differential treatment” and “insists on going behind the facade of 
similarities and differences”.192 Its focus must be “on the actual impact of 
the impugned law, taking full account of social, political, economic and 
historical factors concerning the group”.193 The problem with these kinds 
of general statements is that they focus on considerations that should be 
avoided in the equality analysis, without presenting a positive and direct 
elaboration of the actual essence of the analysis. This had led lower 
courts, in a continuing search for the proper analytic approach, to seize 
upon obiter statements or specific considerations relied upon in particu-
lar Supreme Court decisions, and to structure the entire analysis around 
such statements or considerations. The latest example of this difficulty, in 
the wake of the Court’s recent restatement of the equality “test” in Kapp, 
is an undue reliance on “comparator groups” as the basis for the analysis. 
In Withler, the Court makes plain that, though “equality is a comparative 
concept”, the heavy reliance on comparator groups “may substitute a 
formal ‘treat likes alike’ analysis for the substantive equality analysis that 
has from the beginning been the focus of s. 15(1) jurisprudence”.194 
In Withler, a class of widows challenged a federal pension scheme 
that reduced certain of their benefits because of the age of their husbands 
at the time of their deaths. The relevant statutes included a “supplemen-
tary death benefit”, akin to life insurance, with payment to be made to a 
plan member’s designated beneficiary at the time of the member’s death. 
For younger plan members, the Court held that the purpose of the benefit 
was to insure against unexpected death at a time when the deceased 
member’s beneficiary would be unprotected by a full pension. For older 
members, however, the purpose of the benefit was to assist surviving 
spouses with the costs of the plan member’s last illness and death. This 
benefit was not intended to be a long-term income stream for the spouses 
of older plan members, recognizing that older members would have had 
an opportunity to accrue larger pensions, which their spouses would still 
receive after their deaths. The courts below were divided about the 
appropriate comparator groups, partly because the claimant classes were 
composed of many different surviving spouses in diverse situations and 
because the plan’s scheme was quite complex. This debate provided a 
ripe foundation for revisiting the question of comparator groups. 
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The Court pointed to four problems with the use of comparator 
groups, all of which had been identified in recent academic criticism. 
First, the choice of comparator group may predetermine the outcome of a 
claim. “As a result, factors going to discrimination — whether the distinc-
tion creates a disadvantage or perpetuates prejudice or stereotyping — 
may be eliminated or marginalized.”195 Second, the use of comparators 
“becomes a search for sameness, rather than a search for disadvantage, 
again occluding the real issue — whether the law disadvantages the 
claimant or perpetuates a stigmatized view of the claimant”.196 Third, 
comparator groups can be insensitive to interwoven grounds of discrimi-
nation because they focus on a comparison between two identical groups 
save for a single ground of distinction.197 Somewhat ironically, the Court 
failed to note that Withler was such a case: even though the claimants 
based their claim on discrimination based on age, as one intervener 
observed, the “impugned provisions, while worded in a gender-neutral 
way, disproportionately affect elderly single women, a group that is 
vulnerable and more marginalized than many other groups in society”.198 
Fourth and finally, the use of comparator groups places an unfair burden 
on claimants. In this regard, “finding a mirror group may be impossible, 
as the essence of an individual’s or group’s equality claim may be that, in 
light of their distinct needs and circumstances, no one is like them for the 
purposes of comparison”.199 But even once found, “[r]ational people may 
differ on what characteristics are relevant,” potentially leaving a claimant 
without an adequate evidentiary foundation should a court refashion the 
proposed comparator group proposed by the claimant.200 The Chief 
Justice and Abella J. had alluded to these concerns in a footnote in their 
judgment in Kapp,201 but the point was never expanded upon. In Withler, 
however, the justices note that, “[s]ignificantly, a mirror comparator 
group approach was not assigned a role in the analysis [in Kapp].”202 
Nevertheless, it seems the significance of that omission is only apparent 
now. 
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Withler retains the core of the Kapp test while explicitly ruling out 
the necessity of a comparator group. The two-pronged test remains the 
same: First, does the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or 
analogous ground? Second, does the distinction create a disadvantage by 
perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping? Though “[c]omparison plays a 
role throughout the analysis,” the Chief Justice and Abella J. concluded 
that it is “unnecessary to pinpoint a particular group that precisely 
corresponds to the claimant group except for the personal characteristic 
or characteristics alleged to ground the discrimination”.203 The claimant 
need only “[establish] a distinction based on one or more enumerated or 
analogous grounds”.204 Crucially, in an example of another omission 
from Kapp, the justices expressly endorsed the idea that the distinction 
need not be made on the face of the impugned laws. Rather, a section 
15(1) claim may arise on the adverse effects of an otherwise facially 
neutral law where such effects “can be identified by factors relating to 
enumerated or analogous grounds”.205 However, in such cases of indirect 
discrimination, “the claimant will have more work”.206 Though the reader 
is not told how that burden is to be satisfied, the Chief Justice and Abella 
J. did observe that “[h]istorical or sociological disadvantage may assist in 
demonstrating that the law imposes a burden or denies a benefit to the 
claimant that is not imposed on or denied to others.”207 
On the facts of Withler, the Chief Justice and Abella J. concluded 
that it was “obvious” that a distinction based on age was made because 
surviving spouses of plan members who die before they reach the 
prescribed ages are not subject to a reduced death benefit.208 That was 
sufficient to establish a distinction at the first stage of the Kapp test — no 
comparator group was necessary. At the second stage, however, the Court 
declined to find discrimination, holding that “such schemes of necessity 
must make distinctions on general criteria, including age” and that “[t]he 
question is whether the lines drawn are generally appropriate, having 
regard to the circumstances of the groups impacted and the objects of the 
scheme.”209 Here, the “degree of correspondence between the differential 
treatment and the claimant group’s reality confirms the absence of any 
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negative or invidious stereotyping on the basis of age”.210 The justices 
noted that “[p]erfect correspondence is not required,” suggesting the Court 
is willing to grant lawmakers a degree of deference at the section 15(1) 
stage even where a distinction has been established, without requiring 
justification under section 1.211 
Though the Chief Justice and Abella J. stressed that the Court had 
never sanctioned “a rigid conception of how [equality] should be 
approached”, we hazard that most observers would agree that the 
jurisprudence had indeed become rigid and formulaic as courts struggled 
for a framework within which to grasp complex and admittedly vague 
concepts such as stereotyping.212 Withler does appear to be a positive step 
to the extent that it draws courts away from such approaches in favour of 
a frank admission that case-by-case analyses, sensitive to the full context 
of the claim, offer the best path to fulfilling section 15’s promise of 
equality. What Withler also suggests is that a key organizing concept is 
the degree of “fit” or “correspondence” between the policy objective of a 
law, and the category, classification or distinction utilized in the law in 
order to achieve that objective.213 Yet while this concept of fit is clearly 
central to the analysis in the case (and section 15 more generally), the 
Court remains reluctant to elaborate on this point, other than to confirm 
the need to avoid stereotyping or the perpetuation of disadvantage. On 
the facts here, the Chief Justice and Abella J. noted only that “[t]he 
degree of correspondence between the differential treatment and the 
claimant group’s reality confirms the absence of any negative or invidi-
ous stereotyping on the basis of age” and that “[t]he benefit scheme uses 
age-based rules that, overall, are effective in meeting the actual needs of 
the claimants.”214 Despite these challenges, Withler does indicate that the 
Court is inching forward towards a simpler and more straightforward 
framework for section 15 claims. 
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(b) Ameliorative Programs: Alberta v. Cunningham 
Cunningham confirms and elaborates on the interpretation of section 
15(2) offered in Kapp four years ago. Here, a group of claimants with 
both Indian and Métis heritage challenged an Alberta statute that did not 
permit status Indians to also become formal members of a Métis settle-
ment, asserting that this restriction amounted to discrimination under 
section 15(1). The claimants, resident members of the Métis settlement, 
had opted to register as status Indians in order to obtain medical benefits 
under the Indian Act.215 Consequently, provincial officials revoked their 
formal membership in their Métis settlement, pursuant to the relevant 
statute. The claimants then sued. The Court held, however, that the 
statute amounted to an ameliorative law under section 15(2), the purpose 
of which is “to enhance Métis identity, culture, and self-governance by 
creating a land base for Métis”.216 The exclusion of status Indians from 
membership in the Métis settlement “serves and advances this object and 
hence is protected by s. 15(2)”.217 
The Chief Justice, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that 
while “s. 15(1) is aimed at preventing discrimination on grounds such as 
race, age and sex”, “s. 15(2) is aimed at permitting governments to 
improve the situation of members of disadvantaged groups that have 
suffered discrimination in the past, in order to enhance substantive 
equality”.218 Anticipating the challenge in Cunningham, she also ob-
served that “[i]t is unavoidable that ameliorative programs, in seeking to 
help one group, necessarily exclude others.”219 But the Chief Justice went 
further, stating: 
If governments are obliged to benefit all disadvantaged people (or all 
subsets of disadvantaged people) equally, they may be precluded from 
using targeted programs to achieve specific goals relating to specific 
groups. The cost of identical treatment for all would be loss of real 
opportunities to lessen disadvantage and prejudice.220 
Significantly, the reference to “identical treatment” refers to demands 
for identical ameliorative treatment between already disadvantaged 
groups. In other words, in adopting such a highly deferential attitude 
                                                                                                             
215 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. 
216 Cunningham, supra, note 6, at para. 3. 
217 Id. 
218 Id., at paras. 39-40 (emphasis in original). 
219 Id., at para. 40. 
220 Id., at para. 41 (emphasis added). 
38 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
toward section 15(2), the Court appears to be saying that when the 
government chooses to ameliorate the situation of one disadvantaged 
group, the Court will not step in to demand equal treatment for other 
disadvantaged groups. Under Cunningham, section 15(1) appears to have 
no role when section 15(2) is successfully invoked. Indeed, the Chief 
Justice expressly referred to distinctions being “saved by s. 15(2)”.221 
Cunningham also elaborates on Kapp’s “tentative guide that s. 15(2) 
precludes from s. 15(1) review distinctions made on enumerated or 
analogous grounds that serve and are necessary to the ameliorative 
purpose”.222 Here, the Chief Justice concluded that “‘necessary’ should 
not be understood as requiring proof that the exclusion is essential to 
realizing the object of the ameliorative program”.223 Rather, what is 
required is that the impugned distinction “in a general sense serves or 
advances the object of the program, thus supporting the overall s. 15 goal 
of substantive equality”.224 The Court’s language is telling: “[A]ll the 
government need show is that it was rational for the state to conclude 
that the means chosen to reach its ameliorative goal would contribute to 
its ameliorative purpose.”225 
The Chief Justice acknowledged the obvious question that remains: 
“[U]p to what point does s. 15(2) protect against a claim of discrimina-
tion?”226 For now, we are told that the state cannot choose “irrational 
means to pursue its ameliorative goal”.227 This criterion “may be refined 
and developed as different cases emerge”,228 but for now it would appear 
safe to say that it is a highly deferential one that affords governments 
a wide ambit to craft ameliorative programs that may benefit some 
disadvantaged groups while excluding others. Though Cunningham is 
not necessarily such a case, it is not hard to imagine them: a university 
admissions policy that advantages Aboriginal applicants over applicants 
from other under-represented minority groups, or a disability support 
program that provides funding for those with certain disabilities but not 
others. Under Cunningham, provided the programs have some rational 
basis, they would appear to be fully immune from further judicial 
scrutiny under section 15(1). 
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On the facts of Cunningham, the Court held that the “special type of 
ameliorative program” at issue was not irrational and thus was saved by 
section 15(2).229 Its goal was to establish “a Métis land base to preserve 
and enhance Métis identity, culture and self-governance, as distinct from 
surrounding Indian cultures and from other cultures in the province”.230 
The correlation between the goals of the program and the disadvantage 
suffered by the Métis group was “manifest”: “The history of the Métis is 
one of struggle for recognition of their unique identity as the mixed race 
descendants of Europeans and Indians. Caught between two larger 
identities and cultures, the Métis have struggled for more than two 
centuries for recognition of their own unique identity, culture and 
governance.”231 With this background, the exclusion of persons with dual 
Métis and Indian identities was justifiable because it “serves and ad-
vances the object of the program”.232 To accord formal membership in 
the Métis settlement to such persons “may undercut the goals of preserv-
ing and enhancing the distinctive Métis culture, identity and self-
governance into the future” and “the distinctive Métis identity, with its 
historic emphasis on being distinct from Indian identity, would be 
compromised”.233 We note the curious use of “may” and “would” — in 
the same paragraph no less — with respect to the likelihood that the 
program’s objectives would be undermined. 
III. FEDERALISM CASES 
1. Trade and Commerce 
(a) Reference re Securities Act 
If there were a prize for the most baffling decision of the decade, the 
Court’s unanimous decision to find Canada’s draft national securities act 
unconstitutional would be a fine candidate. In gutting the proposed law, 
the Court handed the federal government a major defeat in a reform 
effort that spanned more than five decades. Though the Court suggested 
that the door remains open to a national regulator achieved “harmoni-
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ously, in the spirit of cooperative federalism”, the all-but-total victory 
achieved by the provinces gives the scheme’s provincial opponents no 
incentive to participate.234 As a practical matter, the question moving 
forward is whether the federal government will be able to craft an 
alternative proposal that works within the restrictive constitutional 
framework set out by the Court. As a legal matter, the question is to what 
extent the Court’s emaciated conception of trade and commerce power 
under section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 will frustrate future 
legislative reform efforts.235 
As is the norm with references, the opinion was signed “by the 
Court”. At its core, the Court’s reasons appear to boil down to the simple 
proposition that, because the provinces have historically regulated 
securities markets, the federal government cannot upset the status quo. 
More specifically, first, the Court decisively rejected Canada’s contention 
that the “the securities market has been so transformed as to make the 
day-to-day regulation of all aspects of trading in securities a matter of 
national concern”.236 Second, though the Court accepted that aspects of 
the securities market have evolved to be national in scope, these aspects 
— chiefly the management of systemic risk and national data collection 
— do not “justify a complete takeover of provincial regulation”, because 
to do so “would disrupt rather than maintain” the balance of Canada’s 
federal system.237 The Court repeatedly pointed out that its analysis was 
restricted to the general branch of the trade and commerce power, which 
may lead one to wonder whether the Court was inviting justification on 
another ground and whether Canada was well served by restricting its 
justification to that power.238 
In its analysis, the Court applied the “the settled test” from General 
Motors. Broadly speaking, its focus, as the Court observed, is on ensur-
ing that federal legislation is “genuinely national in scope and qualita-
tively distinct from those falling under provincial heads of power relating 
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to local matters and property and civil rights.”239 Of the five General 
Motors factors,240 the first two were “[c]learly ... met” and the proposed 
law’s constitutionality hinged on the last three.241 Quoting from Dickson 
C.J.C.’s opinion in General Motors, the Court observed that “the final three 
share a common theme — namely that the scheme of regulation [must 
be] national in scope and that local regulation would be inadequate”.242 
The Court on multiple occasions pointed out that its analysis of what 
is “inadequate” did not necessitate an assessment of policy considera-
tions,243 but such a view misrepresents both the analysis in General 
Motors itself and what the Court in fact did in the Securities Reference. 
In General Motors, where the Court considered the constitutionality of 
the federal competition regime, Dickson C.J.C. pointed to “the diverse 
economic, geographical, and political factors which make it essential that 
competition be regulated on the federal level” and cited with approval 
scholarly articles arguing on policy reasons why national regulation was 
more effective.244 Indeed, Dickson C.J.C. concluded “from this discus-
sion that competition cannot be effectively regulated unless it is regulated 
nationally.”245 In underscoring Parliament’s rationale for passing the 
challenged statute, Dickson C.J.C. cautioned that “a certain degree of 
judicial restraint in proposing strict tests which will result in striking 
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down such legislation is appropriate”.246 Mysteriously, however, the 
Court glosses over this aspect of General Motors.247 Moreover, as the 
discussion that follows will illustrate, the Court did make judgments 
about the policy goals of the proposed federal securities regime when 
undertaking its analysis. 
The third factor under General Motors is “whether the proposed Act 
is directed at trade as a whole rather than at a particular industry”.248 The 
Court accepted Canada’s argument that the regulation of the securities 
market as a conceptual matter “goes beyond a particular ‘industry’ and 
engages ‘trade as a whole’ within the general trade and commerce power 
as contemplated by the General Motors test”.249 Accordingly, legislation 
restricted to preserving the “stability and integrity of Canada’s financial 
markets might well relate to trade as a whole”.250 The Court found, 
however, that the Act as drafted “reaches beyond such matters and 
descends into the detailed regulation of all aspects of trading in securi-
ties, a matter that has long been viewed as provincial”.251 For such reach 
to be justified, “Canada must present the Court with a factual matrix that 
supports its assertion of a constitutionally significant transformation such 
that regulating every aspect of securities trading is no longer an industry-
specific matter, but now relates, in its entirety, to trade as a whole.”252 
Ultimately, the Court concluded that Canada failed to demonstrate 
“the asserted transformation” and that “the day-to-day regulation of 
securities ... remains essentially a matter of property and civil rights 
within the provinces and therefore subject to provincial power”.253 The 
basis for this conclusion is perplexing. The Court justified this conclu-
sion on the single fact that “the structure and terms of the proposed Act 
largely replicate the existing provincial schemes belies the suggestion 
that the securities market has been wholly transformed over the years”.254 
But for this reasoning to have merit, one would have to assume that the 
provincial regimes regulated particular industries exclusively and not 
trade as a whole. On the contrary, however, one might observe that the 
provincial regimes do regulate local trade as a whole and that the federal 
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regime merely proposed to do the same on a nationwide basis. Whether 
one regime replicates another is thus neither here nor there with respect 
to whether it is an “industry” being regulated or “trade as a whole”. The 
Court’s analysis with respect to this factor thus appears misconceived, 
confusing matters properly considered under the fifth General Motors 
criterion. The third factor could have been resolved on much simpler 
grounds: The proposed Act, as Dalphond J.A. observed at the Quebec 
Court of Appeal, “is not limited to regulating the securities industry or ... 
enterprises whose primary business is trading in securities; rather, it 
extends as well to ... no less than an entire sector of the Canadian 
economy”.255 
The fourth General Motors criterion is concerned with “the constitu-
tional capacity of the provinces and territories to enact a similar scheme 
acting in concert”.256 Here, the Court agreed that the provinces “lack the 
constitutional capacity” to address two aspects of the federal regime — 
the control of systemic risk and national data collection — that “antici-
pat[e] and identif[y] risks that may transcend the boundaries of a specific 
province”.257 But because the proposed law contained “detailed regula-
tion of all aspects of securities” that could be addressed provincially, the 
Court concluded that “the proposed federal Act overreaches the legisla-
tive interest of the federal government”.258 
The Court’s reasoning with respect to the fourth criterion contains a 
crucial but unspoken policy judgment that favours the arguments 
advanced by provincial opponents of the federal scheme. The Court 
accepted that there was some value to be obtained from controlling 
nationwide systemic risk and collecting national data on a national basis, 
and held that there is nothing the provinces could do, alone or acting in 
concert, to address these issues in a permanent fashion.259 In doing so, 
however, the Court engaged in a subtle normative judgment that defined 
systemic risk and nationwide data collection as concerns that are neces-
sarily federal.260 For example, the Court found that “[t]he expert evi-
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dence adduced by Canada provides support for the view that systemic 
risk is an emerging reality, ill-suited to local legislation.”261 As the Court 
noted, “[t]he point is not that the provinces are constitutionally or 
practically unable to adopt legislation aimed at systemic risk within the 
provinces.”262 Rather, it is that they lack the constitutional capacity to 
regulate extra-territorially with respect to systemic risk and national data 
collection and, thus, that the desired effect of such regulation cannot 
be achieved. Even if they collaborated with one another, because the 
provinces always retain the ability to resile from an interprovincial 
scheme and withdraw an initial delegation to a single national regulator, 
the Court found that the fourth General Motors factor weighed in favour 
of Canada with respect to systemic risk and data collection.263 
The problem with the Court’s approach here is that the same logic 
could be applied for nationally harmonized disclosure requirements, 
insider trading rules or, indeed, anything else in the proposed federal 
scheme. In each case, the provinces lack the capacity to regulate such 
matters extra-territorially with a guarantee that no province will resile, 
thereby undercutting the ability to achieve the desired national effect. 
Even if they act collaboratively, for the reasons the Court pointed out and 
accepted with respect to systemic risk and data collection, such action 
would still not satisfy the fourth criterion. The difference, therefore, 
between systemic risk and data collection, on the one hand, and every-
thing else in the proposed Act, on the other, is that the Court — albeit 
without saying so — found the latter group not to be “ill-suited to local 
legislation”. In other words, in sharp contrast to that of the federal 
government, which obviously sees tremendous value in national har-
monization, the Court sees little or nothing to be gained. That disagree-
ment reflects a policy judgment, not a legal one. Indeed, for precisely the 
same reason that the Court accepted with respect to systemic risk and 
data collection — that there is some value to be gained by a nationwide 
response to these concerns — one could conclude that the other matters 
addressed by the proposed federal regime cannot be adequately ad-
dressed by the provinces. 
The fifth and final General Motors inquiry asks “whether the ab-
sence of a province from the scheme would prevent its effective opera-
tion”.264 Here, again, the Court engaged in an unspoken policy judgment. 
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With respect to the “genuine national goals ... including national data 
collection and prevention of and response to systemic risks, the answer 
must be yes”.265 But because the bulk of the proposed Act is “concerned 
with the day-to-day regulation of securities, the proposed Act would not 
founder if a particular province declined to participate in the federal 
scheme”.266 One is left to wonder, again, what makes guarding against 
systemic risk and data collection, but not other aspects of the federal 
scheme, “genuine” national goals. Even more confounding, however, 
was the Court’s criticism of the federal scheme’s opt-in feature.267 
Despite the Court’s many invocations of the manifold benefits of co-
operative federalism, it appears here to be suggesting that Canada would 
have fared better if it had not compromised on its ultimate objective by 
compelling participation by all provinces immediately instead of seeking 
gradually to win full membership in the national scheme. 
Ultimately, weighing all five of the General Motors factors, the Court 
concluded that the scheme “chiefly regulates contracts and property 
matters within each of the provinces and territories, overlain by some 
measures directed at the control of the Canadian securities market as a 
whole that may transcend intra-provincial regulation of property and 
civil rights”.268 It thus answered the reference question — whether the 
proposed act was constitutional — in the negative.269 Instead of the 
current proposal, it counselled “a cooperative approach that permits a 
scheme that recognizes the essentially provincial nature of securities 
regulation while allowing Parliament to deal with genuinely national 
concerns remains available”.270 
We offer two thoughts in closing. First, and as mentioned above, the 
Court’s review of the constitutionality of the proposed Act necessarily 
involved policy judgments, notwithstanding its insistence to the contrary. 
As the earlier discussion of General Motors showed, the Court has 
forthrightly engaged in such assessments in the past. The remaining 
question then is how it should do so. Writing for the majority in Cana-
dian Western Bank, Binnie and LeBel JJ. cautioned that courts must 
recognize that “the task of maintaining the balance of powers in practice 
falls primarily to governments, and constitutional doctrine must facilitate, 
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not undermine what this Court has called ‘co-operative federalism’”.271 
Distilled, the principle appears to be one of deference and restraint, 
allowing the political process to work itself out while remaining above 
the fray. For that reason, as Laskin C.J.C. observed in the Anti-Inflation 
Reference, the federal government need only “go so far as to persuade 
the Court that there is a rational basis for the legislation which it is 
attributing to the head of power invoked”.272 The decision in the Securi-
ties Reference, however, represents a troubling and, in our view, prob-
lematic break with this tradition of deference and restraint. 
Second, the Court’s fear here appears to have been if this, then what 
next? The opinion, for example, stated that “the validity of the Act 
ultimately comes down to the breadth of the general branch of the federal 
trade and commerce power” and voiced concerns that “[a]n overly 
expansive interpretation of the federal trade and commerce ... would 
have the potential to duplicate and perhaps displace, through the 
paramountcy doctrine, the clear provincial powers over local matters and 
property and civil rights which embrace trade and commerce in the 
province.”273 These fears have been voiced repeatedly by courts over 
many decades as the basis for the need to truncate the scope of federal 
authority over the regulation of trade and commerce. But we suggest that 
these fears are vastly overblown, because, as recently noted in a similar 
case by a sister high court, “[w]hen contemplated in its extreme, almost 
any power looks dangerous.”274 In the Canadian context, there are at least 
two reasons not to overreact to the spectre of unrestrained federal power. 
First, as Dickson C.J.C. counselled in General Motors, “careful case by 
case analysis remains appropriate”;275 in other words, the fact that the 
outcome in a particular case might favour federal regulation does not 
inevitably or necessarily compel similar results in future cases. Second, 
the courts have consistently been careful in policing the scope of the 
paramountcy doctrine, precisely in order to avoid the possibility that it 
not be used to displace the scope of overlapping provincial legislation.276 
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With those points in mind, in our view, the “gradual but radical transfor-
mation of the concrete reality of the capital market, a market that has 
become Canada-wide, integrated and vital to thousands of diverse 
enterprises, and is essentially characterized by interprovincial and 
international transactions” should not have been a bridge too far, espe-
cially when this day had been anticipated for so long.277 
2. Interjurisdictional Immunity 
(a) Canada v. PHS Community Services Society 
After breathing some life into interjurisdictional immunity in 2010,278 
the Court last year once again distanced itself from the concept in PHS. 
Though the Court ultimately rejected the federalism argument in PHS, 
the case highlights how courts may intervene in a policy disagreement 
between different levels of government, resulting in a breakdown of 
cooperative federalism, where there is a clear Charter rights-based nexus 
(see section II.3(a) above for the discussion regarding the section 7 
Charter claim and fuller overview of the facts). The case pitted the 
federal criminal law power under section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 
1867 against provincial jurisdiction over health under section 92(7). The 
claimants’ principal claim was that interjurisdictional immunity should 
apply to shield provincial decisions about medical treatments from 
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interference by the federal government.279 The controversial doctrine, as 
the Court observed recently, “has produced somewhat ‘asymmetrical’ 
results ... in favour of federal immunity at the expense of provincial 
legislation”.280 That asymmetry was not lost on the majority at the B.C. 
Court of Appeal, which agreed with the claimants and asserted that “[i]f 
interjurisdictional immunity is not available to a provincial undertaking 
on the facts of this case, then it may well be said the doctrine is not 
reciprocal and can never be applied to protect exclusive provincial 
powers.”281 The Supreme Court, in its unanimous decision, disagreed. 
The breadth of the province’s asserted immunity doomed the claim-
ant’s argument. They asserted that “decisions about what treatment may 
be offered in provincial health facilities lie at the core of the provincial 
jurisdiction in the area of health care, and are therefore protected from 
federal intrusions by the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity”.282 The 
Chief Justice observed, however, that interjurisdictional immunity has 
applied to “circumscribed areas” of activity, such as aviation, ports and 
federal communications works, but “never ... to a broad and amorphous 
area of jurisdiction”.283 More specifically, the Chief Justice identified 
three separate reasons the claimants’ argument could not succeed. First, 
though not itself determinative, “the proposed core of the provincial 
power over health has never been recognized in the jurisprudence”.284 
Second, and crucially, the claimants “failed to identify a delineated ‘core’ 
of an exclusively provincial power” as is required by the jurispru-
dence.285 On these facts, it was particularly problematic that the provin-
cial health power “extends to thousands of activities and to a host of 
different venues”, consequently rendering quite “daunting the task of 
drawing a bright line around a protected provincial core of health where 
federal legislation may not tread”.286 Third and finally, “application of 
interjurisdictional immunity to a protected core of the provincial health 
power has the potential to create legal vacuums”.287 For example, 
Parliament would not be able to legislate on “controversial medical 
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procedures, such as human cloning or euthanasia”.288 Such a legislative 
vacuum is “inimical to the very concept of the division of powers”.289 
The decision in PHS is consistent with the Court’s recent assess-
ments of interjurisdictional immunity. The case reiterates the core 
message from Canadian Western Bank, the most significant interjurisdic-
tional immunity case under the McLachlin Court, where Binnie and 
LeBel JJ. cautioned against expanding interjurisdictional immunity into 
new spheres. Here, the Chief Justice recalled that “the modern trend is to 
strike a balance between the federal and provincial governments, through 
the application of pith and substance analysis and a restrained application 
of federal paramountcy”.290 At the same time, PHS does not undermine 
the message in Lacombe and COPA,291 two other recent decisions, which 
made clear that the doctrine has staying power where there is a long line 
of precedent applying it in a recognized context. 
3. Paramountcy 
(a) Quebec v. Canada 
The case involves a relatively straightforward application of existing 
paramountcy rules. The facts concern an individual who, following an 
industrial accident, received certain income replacement benefits from 
both federal and provincial agencies. He was not entitled to some of the 
federal benefits. The provincial agency complied with a requirement, 
pursuant to federal law, from the federal agency to recover those federal 
benefits to which he was not entitled by garnishing certain of his provin-
cial benefits. The individual challenged those garnishments, however, on 
the basis of a provincial law that provides that income replacement 
benefits are unseizable. Applying the federal paramountcy rule most 
recently articulated in COPA, Deschamps J. for a unanimous Court found 
a conflict of purposes between the relevant federal and provincial schemes 
and thus held the provincial scheme inoperative.292 
The decision is more notable for its brief discussion of the Crown 
immunity rule. Canada had invoked the rule, which holds that the Crown 
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is not bound by any enactment unless the enactment so provides,293 
arguing that the provincial statute is inapplicable to the federal Crown. 
Because paramountcy concerns the operability of a statute while the 
Crown immunity rule concerns its applicability, and because the Court 
has generally favoured assessing applicability before operability, Canada 
sought to dispose of the case using Crown immunity.294 Justice Deschamps 
acknowledged that the Court has generally adopted validity-applicability-
operability analytical hierarchy as a matter of “judicial policy”.295 But 
she concluded that paramountcy should be considered before Crown 
immunity for three reasons: (1) the immunity has been eroded over time; 
(2) the exceptions to the rule are so numerous that the law in this area 
exceedingly complex; and (3) the rule has tended to benefit the federal 
Crown asymmetrically.296 These concerns echo those voiced by others.297 
Ultimately, Deschamps J. concluded: 
Although the courts cannot change the Crown immunity rule given that 
it is set out in [statute], this does not mean that they are required to 
apply it systematically. Where a case can be decided without recourse 
to Crown immunity, the court should generally give preference to the 
other grounds raised by the parties.298 
Accordingly, on these facts, she proceeded with a paramountcy 
analysis. 
IV. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS CASES 
1. Identifying Aboriginal Rights 
(a) Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General) 
Lax Kw’alaams is the latest in a string of decisions issued by the 
Court over the last two decades concerning the identification of Aborigi-
nal rights under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. In his last 
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constitutional decision for the Court, Binnie J. took the opportunity to 
clarify and further tweak that jurisprudence. First, Binnie J. put to bed 
the notion that the Court had embraced a more liberal approach to the 
requisite connection between a claimed right and an Aboriginal commu-
nity’s traditions for the right to be recognized for constitutional purposes. 
Some observers had thought the Court’s reference in Sappier to a 
community’s pre-contact “way of life” signalled a departure from the 
Court’s somewhat convoluted “distinctive culture” test as set out in 
Van der Peet.299 However, Binnie J. clarified that no such departure was 
intended and, citing Van der Peet, that the threshold remains one where 
an Aboriginal claimant “must demonstrate that the practice, custom or 
tradition was a central and significant part of the society’s distinctive 
culture”.300 
Second, Binnie J. offered the most extensive treatment on the limits 
of an Aboriginal right’s evolution. The claimants in Lax Kw’alaams 
asserted an Aboriginal right to the commercial harvesting and sale of all 
species of fish within their traditional waters. Though the trial judge 
found that the harvesting and consumption of fish was an integral part 
of the community’s distinctive culture, there was no finding that the 
community engaged in anything beyond “some form of loosely termed 
trade” with the exception of limited trade in one fish variety, the eucha-
lon.301 The challenge for the claimants thus was not whether the means of 
exercising an Aboriginal right could evolve but whether the subject 
matter of the right itself could. The answer from a unanimous Court was 
a firm, No. “A ‘gathering right’ to berries based on pre-contact times 
would not, for example, ‘evolve’ into a right to ‘gather’ natural gas 
within the traditional territory”, Binnie J. observed. “While courts have 
recognized that Aboriginal rights must be allowed to evolve within 
limits, such limits are both quantitative and qualitative.”302 In this case, 
an industrial fishery would represent “an outcome qualitatively different 
from the pre-contact activity on which it would ostensibly be based, 
and out of all proportion to its original importance to the pre-contact 
[Aboriginal] economy”.303 Furthermore, because of the small amount of 
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trading activity relative to overall harvesting, “to extrapolate a modern 
commercial fishery from the pre-contact trade in eulachon grease would 
lack proportionality in quantitative terms relative to the overall pre-
contact fishing activity as well”.304 For that reason, Binnie J. concluded 
that the “Lax Kw’alaams’ attempt to build a full-blown twenty-first 
century commercial fishery on the narrow support of an ancestral trade in 
eulachon” must fail.305 
Third, and perhaps most notably, Binnie J. added a new element to 
the test for identifying an Aboriginal right. The preliminary stages remain 
the same. First, a claimant must prove a pre-contact practice, tradition or 
custom that was integral to the distinctive pre-contact Aboriginal society. 
Second, the claimant must show that the claimed modern right (assuming 
it differs from the pre-contact practice) is demonstrably connected to, and 
reasonably regarded as a continuation of, the pre-contact practice. Under 
the approach advanced in Lax Kw’alaams, however, if the claimed 
modern right is a right to trade commercially, the court when “delineat-
ing” such a right must have regard for conservation goals, the pursuit of 
economic and regional fairness, and the recognition of the historical 
reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by non-Aboriginal 
groups.306 Binnie J. cited Gladstone for this proposition, acknowledging, 
however, that the discussion of such factors in that case was in the 
context of Sparrow justification.307 Chief Justice Lamer, writing for the 
majority in Gladstone, explained that such a balancing of interests was 
necessary where the Aboriginal right in question contained no “internal 
limitation”.308 In Sparrow, for example, where a right to fish for food, 
social and ceremonial purposes was recognized, the right was “internally 
limited” because “at a certain point the band will have sufficient fish to 
meet these needs”.309 Accordingly, Sparrow, as interpreted in Gladstone, 
stood for the proposition that Aboriginal rights holders should be 
afforded priority over others and that “when that right has been satisfied 
... other users can be allowed to participate in the fishery”.310 If the right 
were a commercial one, however, Gladstone recognized that the notion 
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of priority would become one of exclusivity, and “such a result was not 
the intention of Sparrow”.311 It was in that context that Lamer C.J.C. 
suggested that other interests should be balanced — as part of a Sparrow 
infringement and justification analysis — against the rights of the 
Aboriginal claimants. Lax Kw’alaams, however, appears to hold that 
Gladstone balancing should occur when “delineating” the scope of the 
right itself.312 If only as a matter of analytical structure, this is a signifi-
cant shift and, for that reason, it is puzzling that Binnie J. chose not to 
further explain the Court’s rationale in effecting it. 
The impact of Lax Kw’alaams will likely soon be felt in lower 
courts. On March 29, the Court denied leave to appeal in Canada v. 
Ahousaht Indian Band and Nation but remanded the case back to the 
B.C. Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of the holding in Lax 
Kw’alaams.313 Two things are notable about Ahousaht in the context of 
Lax Kw’alaams. First, the Court of Appeal narrowed the scope of the 
Aboriginal fishing right recognized by the trial judge with respect to one 
species of fish on the basis that as it was “high tech fishery of very recent 
origin, there can be no viable suggestion that the ancestors of the 
respondents could have participated in the commercial harvesting and 
trading of this particular marine resource at some time before contact 
with explorers and traders late in the 18th century”.314 This finding 
appears vulnerable in light of Lax Kw’alaams. Justice Binnie remarked 
that “a court ought not to ‘freeze’ today’s permissible catch to species 
present in 1793 in the northwest coastal waters of British Columbia” 
were it established, for example, that “a defining feature of the distinc-
tive [Aboriginal] culture was to catch whatever fish they could and trade 
whatever fish they caught”.315 
Second, though the trial judge in the case found a quasi-commercial 
Aboriginal right to “fish and to sell fish”, she expressly declined to 
circumscribe the ambit of the right when delineating it.316 Justice Garson 
(as she then was) said: “Beyond stating that the right does not extend to a 
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modern industrial fishery or to unrestricted rights of commercial sale, I 
decline to do so. Limitations on the scope of the right are most appropri-
ately addressed at the infringement and justification stages of the analysis, 
as part of the reconciliation process.”317 The Court of Appeal did not 
take issue with this approach.318 However, in light of the holding from 
Lax Kw’alaams that some form of balancing should occur when delineat-
ing a right, the right in question in Ahousaht may on remand need to be 
both broadened (because it is no longer frozen in time) and narrowed 
(because of countervailing concerns with respect to commercial rights). 
V. THE JUSTICES 
1. Opinion Authorship 
As usual, the Chief Justice remained the most prolific author of con-
stitutional judgments, crafting a total of seven opinions (including six 
majority opinions),319 but was joined last year by Deschamps J., who also 
wrote seven opinions (four majorities, one dissent, and two concur-
rences). The remaining majority opinions were roughly evenly spread 
among the other justices, though neither Fish J. nor Rothstein J. authored 
a single majority opinion in 2011. In a year with so much unanimity 
among the justices, only four justices had occasion to craft dissenting 
opinions in 2011: each of Deschamps, Fish and Cromwell JJ. penned a 
single dissent, while Abella J. wrote two. 
2. Voting Patterns 
As mentioned previously, 2011 was a year of remarkable unanimity 
on the Court. The justices agreed in all but four cases, or 78 per cent of 
the time, in marked contrast with 2010, when they agreed in only 56 per 
cent of constitutional cases (14 of 25 cases).320 Justice Binnie, in his last 
year at the Court, was the only justice to be in the majority in every 
single constitutional case (see Table 1, below). He was followed by the 
Chief Justice and Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. — the same 
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group of five justices as last year, albeit with the order slightly rear-
ranged. The figures for split decisions (that is, decisions with multiple 
opinions, even where the Court was unanimous in its holding) are 
especially interesting (see Table 2, below).321 Among these decisions, 
Fish J. joined the majority opinion only half the time (3 of 6 cases). He 
was followed by Deschamps J., who joined the Court’s majority opinion 
in 67 per cent of the split decisions (4 of 7 cases). 














































Majority % 94% 100% 89% 83% 82% 89% 95% 95% 94% 
Dissent % 0% 0% 0% 6% 6% 11% 0% 0% 6% 
Concur % 6% 0% 11% 11% 12% 0% 5% 5% 0% 














































Majority % 86% 100% 71% 57% 50% 71% 86% 86% 83% 
Dissent % 0% 0% 0% 14% 17% 29% 0% 0% 17% 
Concur % 14% 0% 29% 29% 33% 0% 14% 14% 0% 
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As between the justices, only Charron and Rothstein JJ., owing 
partly to the fact that Charron J. joined Rothstein J.’s concurring opinion 
in Fraser, had the distinction of agreeing with each other in 100 per cent 
of constitutional cases. Following them, the McLachlin-Binnie, Binnie-
Charron and Binnie-Rothstein pairs joined the same opinion in more than 
86 per cent of cases with multiple opinions (see Table 4, below).322 On 
the other end of the spectrum, the Deschamps-Fish and Deschamps-
LeBel pairs joined the same opinion in only 17 per cent and 29 per 
cent of such cases, respectively. More broadly, as the data in Table 4 
illustrates, the three Quebec justices have the lowest agreement ratios 
with their peers. 














































McLachlin N/A 94% 83% 82% 88% 83% 89% 89% 87% 
Binnie 94% N/A 89% 82% 81% 89% 94% 94% 93% 
LeBel 83% 89% N/A 72% 82% 79% 84% 84% 81% 
Deschamps 82% 82% 72% N/A 69% 78% 83% 83% 75% 
Fish 88% 81% 82% 69% N/A 76% 76% 76% 81% 
Abella 83% 89% 79% 78% 76% N/A 89% 89% 88% 
Charron 89% 94% 84% 83% 76% 89% N/A 100% 88% 
Rothstein 89% 94% 84% 83% 76% 89% 100% N/A 88% 
Cromwell 87% 93% 81% 75% 81% 88% 88% 88% N/A 
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McLachlin N/A 86% 57% 57% 67% 57% 71% 71% 67% 
Binnie 86% N/A 71% 57% 50% 71% 86% 86% 83% 
LeBel 57% 71% N/A 29% 50% 43% 57% 57% 50% 
Deschamps 57% 57% 29% N/A 17% 43% 57% 57% 33% 
Fish 67% 50% 50% 17% N/A 33% 33% 33% 50% 
Abella 57% 71% 43% 43% 33% N/A 71% 71% 67% 
Charron 71% 86% 57% 57% 33% 71% N/A 100% 67% 
Rothstein 71% 86% 57% 57% 33% 71% 100% N/A 67% 
Cromwell 67% 83% 50% 33% 50% 67% 67% 67% N/A 
3. Leave and Hearings Statistics 
Considering all cases, the time the Court took to decide leave appli-
cations and schedule hearings increased somewhat in 2011. Most 
notably, in the case of leave applications, the Court took on average 4.1 
months — roughly three weeks longer than last year — to decide 
petitions.323 The average time taken to render a decision, however, fell to 
6.2 months, over a full month less than last year’s record high of 7.7 
months, but still above the Court’s 10-year average of 5.8 months.324 At 
eight cases, the Court also doubled the number of judgments it rendered 
from the bench compared with last year.325 
With the exception of four cases decided by a panel of seven justices, 
all members of the Court participated in the 2011 constitutional cases, as 
                                                                                                             
323 Statistics Bulletin, supra, note 4. 
324 Id. 
325 Id. Even at eight oral judgments, however, the Court is far off from the numbers seen in 
the early years of the McLachlin Court, when as many as 20 judgments were handed down from the 
bench. 
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has been the strong preference of the McLachlin Court. Two of the 
exceptions — Campbell and Loewen — were section 8 cases that 
reached the Court as of right and were decided unanimously. It is unclear 
why the Court sat in a panel of seven in both Lax Kw’alaams and 
Malhab, the two remaining cases. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The past year was an important one for the Court in constitutional 
matters, particularly in relation to freedom of association and labour 
relations in the wake of Health Services, the continued robust application 
of section 7 rights signalled earlier in Chaoulli and reiterated in PHS, as 
well as the continuing and as yet inconclusive search for a straightfor-
ward framework to guide analysis of equality rights claims. The Securi-
ties Reference was clearly the major surprise of the year, with the Court 
relying upon a novel provincial “occupying the field” analysis, resulting 
in a significant constitutional as well as policy defeat for the federal 
government. 
For the second year in a row, Prime Minister Stephen Harper will 
have a chance to change the face of the Court given the retirement of 
Justice Deschamps. With his appointment of Justice Wagner, Mr. Harper 
has named five Supreme Court justices, making 2012 the first year of a 
“Harper Court”.326 Looking to the future, within the next two years Fish 
and LeBel JJ. will reach mandatory retirement age, providing the Prime 
Minister with the opportunity to appoint his sixth and seventh members 
of the Court.327 Of the five appointments Mr. Harper has made to date, 
four may serve on the Court for a decade or more,328 the exception being 
Rothstein J., who must retire by December 2015, just after the next 
federal election, which will be held in October of that year. The point is 
that by the time of the next election, Mr. Harper will have had an 
opportunity to appoint a clear majority of justices who will shape the 
                                                                                                             
326 Mr. Harper previously appointed Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ. 
327 Justice Fish must retire by November 2013 and LeBel J. by November 2014. Both justic-
es are among the most liberal members of the Court and, as the data indicate, have tended to dissent 
from the Court’s core block of five justices relatively frequently. See also Kirk Makin, “End of an 
era looms on Supreme Court” The Globe and Mail (April 18, 2012), online: <http://www.theglobe
andmail.com/news/politics/end-of-an-era-looms-on-supreme-court/article4210348/?page=all>. 
328 Justices Moldaver, Cromwell, Karakatsanis and Wagner will not reach mandatory retire-
ment age until 2022, 2027, 2030 and 2032, respectively. 
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jurisprudence of the Court for years to come.329 Perhaps even more 
importantly, Mr. Harper has now appointed approximately half of the 
federally appointed judges in Canada and this proportion will continue to 
rise between now and the next election in 2015. 
There have been suggestions that there is a confrontation looming 
between the federal government and the judiciary over matters such as 
expanded police powers, prostitution, assisted suicide and refugee 
rights.330 It can also be expected that governments at all levels will be 
required to take measures aimed at reducing the significant budget 
deficits that arose following the economic crisis of 2008-2009, which 
could provoke various forms of legal disputes and challenges. 
There will no doubt be areas of legal conflict between courts and 
governments, including the occasional invalidation of laws, over the 
next number of years. At the same time, it is doubtful that the judiciary 
could be characterized as approaching these issues in monolithic terms. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada under Chief Justice McLachlin’s 
leadership has generally adopted a careful, case-by-case approach to the 
development of constitutional jurisprudence. It would seem likely that 
this trend will continue into the future. 
                                                                                                             
329 It should be noted, however, that the Prime Minister has selected his Supreme Court 
appointees from the ranks of appellate judges who were themselves appointed by previous 
governments, and who have generally been praised for their competence and fairness. 
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